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Abstract
Given a game with uncertain payo¤s, information design analyzes the extent to which the provision of information alone can in‡uence the behavior of the players. Information design has a literal
interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the
best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize
a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to
characterize play in the game under many di¤erent information structures.
We provide an introduction into the basic issues and insights of a rapidly growing literature in
information design. We show how the literal and metaphorical interpretations of information design
unify a large body of existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson (1991)),
Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) and some of our own recent work on robust
predictions in games of incomplete information.
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1

Introduction

Players’payo¤s in a game depend on their actions and also on the realization of a payo¤ relevant state.
An "information designer" can commit how to provide information about the states to the players. "Information design" studies how the information designer, through the choice of the information provided,
can in‡uence the individually optimal behavior of the players to achieve her objective. She can achieve
this objective even though she has no ability to change the game itself, or force the players to choose
particular actions.1
The past decade has seen a rapidly growing body of literature in information design. An in‡uential
paper by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) phrased the optimal design of information as a "Bayesian
persuasion" problem between a sender and single receiver. A large body of work …ts this rubric,
including important contributions of Brocas and Carrillo (2007) and Rayo and Segal (2010). The
economic applications of information design have been investigated in areas as far apart as auction design
(Daskalakis, Papadimitriou, and Tzamos (2016)), grade disclosure and matching markets (Ostrovsky
and Schwarz (2010)), voter mobilization (Alonso and Camara (2016)), tra¢ c routing (Das, Kamenica,
and Mirka (2017)), rating systems (Du¢ e, Dworczak, and Zhu (2017)) and transparency regulation
(Asquith, Covert, and Pathak (2014)) in …nancial markets, price discrimination (Bergemann, Brooks,
and Morris (2015)) and stress tests in banking regulation (Inostroza and Pavan (2017)).
One purpose of the paper is to provide an overview of information design that uni…es this recent
work with a number of literatures sometimes treated as distinct. If we assume that there are many
players, but the information designer (or "mediator") has no informational advantage over the players,
this problem reduces to the analysis of communication in games (Myerson (1991), Section 6.3) and, more
generally, the literature on correlated equilibrium in incomplete information games (Forges (1993)). If
there is only one player (or "receiver") but the information designer (or "sender") has an informational
advantage over the player, the problem reduces to the "Bayesian persuasion" problem of Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011).

Information design concerns the general case where there are both many players

and the information designer has an informational advantage over the players. This case has been the
focus of some our own work (Bergemann and Morris (2013b), (2016a)), where we show that the set of
outcomes that can arise in this setting corresponds to a version of incomplete information equilibrium
("Bayes correlated equilibrium") that allows outcomes to be conditioned on states that the players do
not know.
A second purpose of the paper is to highlight a distinction between literal information design and
1

We follow Taneva (2015) in our use of the term "information design" in this context.
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metaphorical information design. The information design problem has a literal interpretation (given
above): there really is an information designer (or mediator, or sender) who can commit to provide
extra information to players to serve her own interests. While the commitment assumption may be
problematic in many settings, it provides a useful benchmark. But the information design formulation
might also be a metaphor that the analyst uses as a tool. For example, we might be interested in
…nding an upper bound (across information structures) on the aggregate variance of output in a given
economy with idiosyncratic and common shocks to agents’ productivity (Bergemann, Heumann, and
Morris (2015)). We can understand this as an information design problem, where the information
designer is interested in choosing an information structure to maximize aggregate variance in output.
But in this case, we do not have in mind that there is an actual information designer maximizing
aggregate variance. We will discuss this application, and other applications where information design
is metaphorical, below.
A third purpose is to contrast –and at the same time highlight the parallels between–the "information
design" problem with the basic "mechanism design" problem. A "mechanism designer" can commit to a
mechanism for the players to serve her ends, but has no ability to provide the players with any additional
information (or force the players to make particular action choices).2 An "information designer" can
commit to provide information about the states to the players to serve her ends, but has no ability
to change the game of the players (or force the players to make particular action choices). In either
information design or mechanism design, the problem is sometimes studied with a restricted choice set for
the designer. In the information design problem, we could restrict the designer to only choose whether
the players are given no information or complete information about the environment. In the mechanism
design problem, we could restrict the designer to only choose between a …rst price or a second price
auction. However, in each design problem, there is a revelation principle argument that allows for the
analysis of all information structures or all mechanisms respectively. For the mechanism design problem,
we can restrict attention to direct mechanisms where the players’action sets are equal to their type sets.
Conversely, for the information design problem, we can restrict attention to information structures where
the players’type sets are equal to their action sets. In this paper, using this observation, we consider
static information design problems when all information structures are available to the designer.
To survey the literature, and to provide some graphical illustrations, we use a family of two player,
two action, and two state examples. We start with the leading example of Bayesian persuasion (with
2

This statement of the mechanism design problem is a narrow one corresponding to what Myerson (1991) (Section 6.4)

calls "Bayesian collective choice problems." We discuss how what we are calling information design …ts into the broader
mechanism design literature in Section 6.3.
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a single player/receiver with no prior information) from the work of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
We can use extensions of this example - with many players and prior information - to illustrate many
of the key ideas in the survey. Three key substantive general insights are illustrated in these examples.
First, it is often optimal for the information designer to selectively obfuscate information. This
insight is familiar from the case of one player without prior information.
Second, the information designer has less ability to manipulate outcomes in his favor if players have
more prior information: if the players are endowed with their own information, the designer has less
in‡uence over the information structure that they end up with. This insight can already be illustrated
in the one player case. But we will also describe a general partial order on information structures generalizing the Blackwell order for the one player case - which characterizes the right de…nition of
"more information" in this context (Bergemann and Morris (2016a)).
Third, we can ask whether the information designer prefers to give the information to players in
a public or in a private message. Of course, this last question only arises once we have multiple
players. Public information is optimal if the information designer wants perfect correlation between
players’ actions; otherwise private information will be optimal. While the information designer may
have intrinsic preferences over whether players’actions are correlated (or not), the designer may care
about correlation for purely instrumental reasons: if there are strategic complementarities between the
players’ actions, she may want to correlate players’ actions to relax the obedience constraints on her
ability to attain speci…c outcomes. The converse holds for strategic substitutability. We will illustrate
the case when there are only instrumental preferences over correlation.
The examples also illustrate a methodological point. The information design problem can be solved
in two steps. First, we can identify the set of outcomes that could be induced by the information designer.
Second, we can identify which of these outcomes would be preferred by the information designer. This
too parallels the mechanism design literature: we can …rst identify which outcomes are implementable,
and then identify the one most preferred by the designer. As noted above, in the information design
problem, the set of implementable outcomes corresponds to the set of Bayes correlated equilibria. This
approach reduces the problem to a linear program.
The information designer is assumed to be able to commit to an information structure that maps
payo¤-relevant states of the world and private information of the agents (types) into possibly stochastic
signals to the players.3 As the mapping essentially recommends actions to the players, we refer to it as
3

Whether or not the information designer will observe the payo¤ relevant state is irrelevant – what is important is

whether she can condition the signals she sends on the realization of the state and the players’ private signals. For
example, a prosecutor might never know whether the defendant is guilty or innocent, but can nevertheless set up an
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a decision rule. We will initially focus on what we will sometimes call the omniscient case, where the
information designer faces no constraints on her ability to condition the signals on the payo¤-relevant
states of the world and all the players’ prior information (i.e. their types).

But we also consider

information design constrained by private information, where the prior information of the players is
not accessible to the information designer, even though she can condition on the payo¤-relevant states.
There are two cases to consider here: an information designer may be able to condition on the reported
realizations of the players’signals even if she does not observe them (information design with elicitation)
or she may be unable to do so (information design without elicitation). If the information designer cannot
condition on the payo¤ state at all, and has to rely entirely on the private information of the players,
then these three scenarios (omniscient, private information with elicitation and private information
without elicitation) correspond to versions of incomplete information correlated equilibrium: in the
terminology of Forges (1993), the Bayesian solution, communication equilibrium, and strategic form
correlated equilibrium, respectively.
Once the information designer has picked the information structure, the players decide how to play
the resulting game of incomplete information. There may be multiple Bayes Nash equilibria of the
resulting game. In our treatment of the information design problem, we have been implicitly assuming
that the designer can pick which equilibrium is played. Under this maintained assumption, we can appeal
to the revelation principle, and focus attention on information structures where the signal space is set
equal to the action space, and the signals have the interpretation that they are action recommendations.
In the single player case, this maintained equilibrium selection assumption is without loss of generality.
But just as the revelation principle breaks down in mechanism design if the designer does not get to pick
the best equilibrium (as in Maskin (1999)), it similarly breaks down for information design.4 We follow
Mathevet, Perego, and Taneva (2017) in formally describing a notion of maxmin information design,
where an information designer gets to pick an information structure but the selected equilibrium is the
worst one for the designer. We note how some existing work can be seen as an application of maxmin
information design, in particular, an extensive literature on "robustness to incomplete information"
(Kajii and Morris (1997)).
Other assumptions underlying the revelation principle – and maintained throughout this paper –
are that (i) all information structures are feasible, (ii) there is zero (marginal) cost of using information,
(iii) there is a single information designer and (iv) the setting is static. Of course, there are many
investigation process which would provide di¤erent evidence depending on the actual guilt or innocence of the subject and
the information of the judge.

We thank an anonymous referee who stressed the distinction between conditioning on a

state, and actually knowing the realization of the state.
4
This point has been highlighted by Carroll (2016) and Mathevet, Perego, and Taneva (2017).
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(static) settings where the impact of di¤erent information structures has been studied, without allowing
all information structures. Two classic examples would be information sharing in oligopoly (a literature
beginning with Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982)) and the revenue comparison across di¤erent auction
formats in auction theory (Milgrom and Weber (1982)). In the former, there is a restriction to normally
distributed signals, and in the latter there is the restriction to a¢ liated signals.
Optimal information design in dynamic settings has been studied recently in Ely, Frankel, and
Kamenica (2015), Passadore and Xandri (2016), Doval and Ely (2016), Ely (2017), Ely and Szydlowski
(2017), Ball (2017) and Makris and Renou (2017). A new aspect to information design that appears
in these dynamic settings is that information can be used as an incentive device to reward behavior
over time. Horner and Skrzypacz (2016) surveys work on information design in dynamic settings.
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2014) consider the case of costly information and Gentzkow and Kamenica
(2017) allow for multiple information designers. This paper provides a conceptual synthesized guide to
the literature; we discuss applications when they are relevant for this purpose, but make no attempt to
provide a comprehensive survey of the many applications of information design.
We describe the basic information design problem in Section 2. We illustrate the main notions and
ideas with an investment example in Section 3. We discuss key ideas from information design in the
investment example in Section 4. Here we discuss private versus public signals, intrinsic versus instrumental preferences over correlation, the two step procedure for solving information design problems,
ordering information, and the use of concavi…cation in information design (instead of pure linear programming methods). Section 5 describes in more detail two applications of information design, with a
microeconomic and macroeconomic perspective, respectively: limits of price discrimination, and the link
between information and volatility. These two applications emphasize the relevance of the metaphorical
interpretation of information design. In Section 6, we describe what happens when players’ prior information is not known by the information designer; this discussion allows us to locate the information
design problem within the broad overview of mechanism design proposed by Myerson (1982) and with a
larger literature on incomplete information correlated equilibrium reviewed by Forges (1993). In Section
7, we discuss the role of equilibrium selection.
Given the synthetic treatment of the literature, there is much terminology that has been introduced
and used in di¤erent contexts (including by us in prior work), and which is at times inconsistent or
redundant. To give one example, what we are calling an "information designer" has in previous work
been called a sender, a mediator, a principal and a mechanism designer. We are attempting throughout
to use a uni…ed and consistent language, but compromising at times between the use of a consistent
terminology and precedents set by earlier work.
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2

The Information Design Problem

We begin by describing the general setting and notation that we maintain throughout the paper. We
will …x a …nite set of players and a …nite set of payo¤ states of the world. There are I players, 1; 2; :::; I,
and we write i for a typical player. We write
element of

for the payo¤ states of the world and

for a typical

.

A "basic game" G consists of (1) for each player i, a …nite set of actions Ai and an (ex-post) utility
function
ui : A
where we write A = A1
support prior
(Ai ; ui )Ii=1 ;

2
;

! R;

AI , and a = (a1 ; :::; aI ) for a typical element of A; and (2) a full

( ) which is shared by all players and the information designer. Thus G =

. We de…ne the ex post objective of the information designer by:
v:A

! R.

An "information structure" S consists of (1) for each player i, a …nite set of types ti 2 Ti ; and (2) a
type distribution

:

!

(T ), where we write T = T1

TI . Thus S = (Ti )Ii=1 ;

.

Together, the "payo¤ environment" or "basic game" G and the "belief environment" or "information
structure" S de…ne a standard "incomplete information game" (G; S). While we use di¤erent notation,
this division of an incomplete information game into the "basic game" and the "information structure"
is a common one in the literature, see, for example, Gossner (2000).
We are interested in the problem of an information designer who has the ability to commit to a
provide the players with additional information, in order to induce them to make particular action
choices.

In this section, we will consider the leading case where the designer can condition on the

state and on all the players’types –their prior information –if they have any. We will sometimes refer
to this setting as omniscient information design. In Section 6, we will consider the case where prior
information of the players is truly private to them, and hence the information designer cannot condition
on their prior information unless she is able to induce them to reveal it.
If viewed as an extensive form game between the information designer and the players, the timing
is as follows:
1. the information designer picks and commits to a rule for providing the players with extra messages;
2. the true state

is realized;

3. each agent’s type ti is privately realized;
9

4. the players receive extra messages according to the information designer’s rule;
5. the players pick their actions based on their prior information and the messages provided by the
information designer;
6. payo¤s are realized.
We emphasize that the information designer commits to a decision rule before the realization of
the state and type pro…le. This structure in the timing sets the information design problem apart
from informed principal, cheap talk or signalling environments where the informed party commits to a
message only after the state has been revealed.
In general, the information designer could follow any rule for generating messages. However, a "revelation principle" argument implies that it is without loss of generality to assume that the information
designer sends only "action recommendations" that are obeyed.

The argument is that any message

will give rise to an action in equilibrium and we might as well label messages by the actions to which
they give rise.

We discuss the revelation principle in more detail below. Given this restriction, the

information designer is choosing among decision rules
:T

!

(A) .

The information designer can condition the recommended action pro…le on the true state

(1)
2

and

the type vector t 2 T . We stress that the designer does not need to know the true realization of the
state or the type pro…le –it is su¢ cient that the decision rule can condition on these. For example, in
a medical test, the information designer, the doctor, may not know the true condition of the patient,
but can choose a diagnostic test that reveals the condition of the patient to the desired precision and
accuracy.
The decision rule encodes the information that players may receive about the realized state of the
world and the types of the other players. The dependence of the action pro…le a on these is created by
the recommended action that the information designer conveys to the players.
The key restriction on the decision rule is a notion of obedience that we now de…ne. Obedience
is the requirement that the information privately communicated to player i in the form of an action
recommendation ai according to

is such that each player i would want to follow his recommendation

action ai rather than choose any other available action a0i .
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De…nition 1 (Obedience)
Decision rule

:T

a

a

i 2A

i 2A

!

(A) is obedient for (G; S) if, for each i, ti 2 Ti and ai 2 Ai , we have

X

i ;t

i 2T

X

i ;t

i; 2

ui ((ai ; a i ) ; ) ((ai ; a i ) j (ti ; t i ) ; ) ((ti ; t i ) j )
a0i ; a

ui

i 2T

i

;

i; 2

((ai ; a i ) j (ti ; t i ) ; ) ((ti ; t i ) j )

( )

(2)

( ),

for all a0i 2 Ai .
The obedience inequality requires that each player i, after receiving his recommendation ai , assesses
that no other action a0i could yield him a strictly higher utility. While the above inequality is written
from an ex ante perspective, we emphasize that each player when computing his expected utility is
indeed using the information contained in the action recommendation ai . This becomes apparent when
we state the above inequality explicitly in terms of the interim beliefs that agent i holds given his type
ti and his action recommendation ai , thus using Bayes’rule explicitly:

a

a

X

i 2A i ;t i 2T i ;

X

i 2A i ;t i 2T i ;

2

ui ((ai ; a i ) ; ) P

a00 i 2A

ui

a0i ; a

i

P

;

a00 i 2A

2

00
i ;t i

((ai ; a i ) j (ti ; t i ) ; ) ((ti ; t i ) j ) ( )
ai ; a00 i j ti ; t00 i ; 00
ti ; t00 i j
2T i ; 00 2

00
i ;t i

((ai ; a i ) j (ti ; t i ) ; ) ((ti ; t i ) j ) ( )
ai ; a00 i j ti ; t00 i ; 00
ti ; t00 i j
2T i ; 00 2

00

00

We observe that the belief of agent i updates independently of whether he is following the recommendation ai or deviating from it to a0i . Moreover, the denominator in Bayes rule sums up over all
possible pro…les a00 i 2 A i ; t00 i 2 T i ;
a

i

2 A i; t

i

2 T i; 2

00

2

, and hence is constant across all possible realizations of

. Hence provided that the denominator is strictly positive we can multiply

through to obtain the earlier inequality (2).
Bergemann and Morris (2016a) de…ne a Bayes correlated equilibrium (BCE) to be any decision rule
satisfying obedience. An important aspect of this solution concept is that the decision rule

enters

the obedience constraints, as stated above in (2), in a linear manner as a probability. Thus, an obedient
decision rule can be computed as the solution to a linear program.
Proposition 1 An omniscient information designer can attain decision rule

if and only if it is a

Bayes correlated equilibrium, i.e. if it satis…es obedience.
By "can attain decision rule" we mean that there exists a (perhaps indirect) communication rule

11

00

00

.

that gives rise to this decision rule in Bayes Nash equilibrium.5 We refer to the resulting (ex ante)
joint distribution of payo¤ state

and action pro…le a as the outcome of the information design, thus

integrating out the private information t:
X

(ajt; ) (tj )

( ):

t2T

In this (and later) propositions, we omit formal statements and proofs that correspond to revelation
principle arguments. Bergemann and Morris (2016a) give a formal statement6 and proof of this proposition as Theorem 1. The argument is a straightforward adaptation of standard characterizations of
complete and incomplete information correlated equilibrium.
If there is no payo¤ uncertainty, that is if the set

is a singleton, then the notion of Bayes correlated

equilibrium exactly coincides with the complete information correlated equilibrium as introduced in the
seminal contributions of Aumann (1974) and (1987). In the absence of payo¤ uncertainty, we can simply
suppress the dependence of the payo¤ function on
does not vary with
rule

as

does not vary. Moreover the decision rule

nor is there any private information t about the state of the world . A decision

is then simply a joint distribution over actions, or

2

(A). Now, a distribution

2

(A) is

de…ned to be a correlated equilibrium if for each i and ai 2 Ai , we have:
a

X

ui (ai ; a i ) ((ai ; a i ))
a

i 2A i

X

ui a0i ; a

i

(ai ; a i ) .

(3)

i 2A i

The above obedience condition (2) thus collapses to the best response property (3) in the absence of
uncertainty. Aumann (1987) argued that correlated equilibrium captured the implications of common
knowledge of rationality in a complete information game (under the common prior assumption); this is
an interpretation of the statement that correlated equilibrium captures the set of outcomes attainable
by an information designer in the absence of payo¤. We discuss these interpretational issues and the
literature on incomplete information correlated equilibrium more broadly in Section 6.4.
The proof of Proposition 1 in Bergemann and Morris (2016a) , like the proof of Aumann (1987), is
a "revelation principle" argument, establishing that it is without loss of generality to focus on a set of
signals that equals the set of actions to be taken by the agents - so that there is "direct communication"
- and to recommend actions in such way that they will be obeyed - so that "incentive compatibility"
gives rise to "obedience" conditions. In the case of complete information, Myerson (1991) (section 6.2)
5

We do not discuss information design under solution concepts other than Bayes Nash equilibrium in this paper.

Mathevet, Perego, and Taneva (2017) study information design under bounded level rationalizability and Inostroza and
Pavan (2017) under full rationalizability.
6
A formal statement also appears in Section 7.
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describes this as the "revelation principle for strategic form games". Note that while the expression
"revelation principle" is sometimes limited to the case where agents are sending messages rather than
receiving them (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green (1995)), we
follow Myerson in using the broader meaning throughout the paper. In the basic information design
described in this section, the only incentive constraints are obedience conditions but we discuss the
extension to the case where the information designer must elicit players’private information in Section
6, where truth-telling incentive constraints also arise.

We postpone a discussion of how to place

information design in the broader context of the mechanism design literature until then.
Proposition 1 characterizes the set of outcomes that an information design could attain, i.e., a feasible
set. To complete the description of the basic information design problem, we need an objective. Given
the information designer’s ex post utility v, her ex ante utility of the information designer from decision
rule

for a given game of incomplete information (G; S) is:
V ( )=

X

v (a; ) (ajt; ) (tj )

( ).

(4)

a2A;t2T; 2

The (omniscient) information design problem is then to pick a BCE

to maximize V ( ). When there

is a single player with no prior information, the information design problem reduces to the benchmark
Bayesian persuasion problem described by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). In this case, the single
player is called the "receiver" and the information designer is called the "sender".

3

An Investment Example

We now apply this framework to an investment game and discuss the main themes of information design
through the lens of this example.
We …rst consider the following benchmark setting. There is a bad state (B) and a good state (G).
The two states are equally likely. There is one player (the "…rm"). The …rm can decide to invest or
not invest. The payo¤ from not investing is normalized to 0. The payo¤ to investing is

1 in the bad

state and x in the good state, with 0 < x < 1. These payo¤s, u (a; ), are summarized in the following
matrix:
u (a; )

bad state B

invest
not invest

1

good state G
x

0

0
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:

(5)

3.1

Single Player without Prior Information

We begin the analysis when the …rm has no prior information about the state (beyond the uniform
prior). Together with the above assumptions about the payo¤ matrix, the …rm would therefore choose
to not invest if it had no additional information.
We will assume that an information designer (the "government") is interested in maximizing the
probability of investment. This example is (modulo some changes in labelling) the leading example in
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). We will describe this example …rst, but then use variations to illustrate
more general points. The decision rule is now simply:
:

!

(A) ;

where we can omit the type space T . In this binary decision environment, the decision rule
the probability of investment, denoted by p , conditional on the true state

( ) speci…es

2 fB; Gg. Thus a decision

rule is a pair (pB ; pG ) of investment probabilities. We can think of a decision rule as a (stochastic)
action recommendation from the government. If the recommendations are obeyed, the outcome - the
ex ante distribution over states and actions - is given by:
(a j )

( )

invest
not invest

bad state B

good state G

1
2 pB
1
2 (1

1
2 pG
1
2 (1

pB )

:
pG )

If the …rm receives a recommendation to invest, it will update its beliefs about the state by Bayes’rule.
The …rm’s interim expected utility from following the recommendation represents the left hand side of
the inequality below. If the …rm were to disobey the recommendation and chose not to invest, then its
payo¤ would be zero. This gives rise to the following obedience constraint:
1
2 pB
1
1
2 pB + 2 pG

( 1) +

1
2 pG
x
1
1
2 pB + 2 pG

0.

(6)

As we discussed following De…nition 1, we can simplify the inequality by multiplying through with the
conditioning probability 12 pB + 12 pG , and thus write the obedience condition equivalently in terms of the
ex-ante probabilities, which we shall always do from now on:
1
1
pB ( 1) + pG x
2
2

0 , pG

pB
.
x

(7)

There is an analogous obedience constraint corresponding to the recommendation not to invest, namely:
0

1
(1
2

pB ) ( 1) +
14

1
(1
2

pG ) x:

Because the …rm would not invest absent information from the designer - by our maintained assumption that x < 1 - the binding obedience constraint will be the one corresponding to investment,
i.e., inequality (7). We see that the highest probability of investment is the decision rule with pG = 1
and pB = x.
We illustrate the set of BCE decision rules for the case where x = 55=100 in Figure 1. Any decision
rule (pB ; pG ) in the blue shaded area can arise as some BCE. We observe that the feasible set of BCE
does not depend on the government’s preference v (a; ).
Insert Figure 1: Investment Probability with Uninformed Player: x = 55=100
Now every BCE decision rule corresponds to optimal behavior under some information structure S.
By the revelation principle for the BCE, it su¢ ces to give the …rm a binary information structure S to
implement any BCE decision rule in the binary action environment. For the outcome that maximizes
the probability of investment, it su¢ ces to generate a no-investment recommendation with probability
1

x if the state is bad, and otherwise give the …rm an investment recommendation. The resulting

outcome - the ex ante distribution over states and actions - is given by:
(a j )

( )

invest
not invest

bad state B

good state G

1
2x
1
2 (1

1
2

x)

:

(8)

0

Thus a government trying to encourage investment will obfuscate the states of the world in order to
maximize investment. By pooling realizations of the bad and good states in the recommendation to
invest, the …rm is made exactly indi¤erent between investing or not when recommended to invest. The
bad state is completely isolated in the recommendation not to invest. Finally, we observe that under
complete information the …rm would always invest in the good state and never invest in the bad state.
We thus have described three di¤erent information structures – zero information, partial information,
and complete information –that support the three vertices of the above investment triangle. Thus, the
set of all investment probabilities that satisfy the obedience constraints can be described by a set of
linear inequalities that jointly from a polyhedron of implementable outcomes.

3.2

Single Player with Prior Information

We remain with the investment example where there is still only one …rm, but now the …rm has some
prior information about the true state that it receives independently of the government.7 In particular,
7

Some detailed calculations for this example appear in the Appendix.
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the …rm has a type (or receives a signal) which is "correct" with probability q > 1=2. Formally, the …rm
observes its type t 2 fb; gg with probability q conditional on the true state being B or G; respectively:
(t j )

bad state B

good state G

bad signal b

q

1

good signal g

1

q

q

:

q

Here, signals refer to the prior information that …rms are endowed with. Conditional on the type of
the …rm, the analysis of the obedience constraints reduces immediately to the analysis of the previous
section, but where the …rm has an updated belief, q or 1

q, depending on the type. We nonetheless

analyze this problem because we want to trace the ex ante implications of a player’s prior information
for information design. A decision rule
the true state

now speci…es the probability of investment p

t

conditional on

2 fB; Gg and the type t 2 fb; gg. Thus a decision rule is now a vector, a quadruple:
p = (pBb ; pBg ; pGb ; pGg ) :

(9)

We can solve the problem - conditional on state and type - as before. For example, the obedience
constraint for the recommendation to invest after receiving a good type g now becomes:
(1

q) pBg ( 1) + qpGg x

0.

(10)

However, we are interested in what we can say about the joint distribution of states and actions ex ante,
integrating out the types, say
pG = qpGg + (1

q) pGb :

One can show that there is a lower bound on investment in the good state given by:
pG
which approaches 1 as q approaches 1.

1

q

q
x

;

(11)

As before, the bound for pG depends on pB and the lowest

bound is obtained by taking pB = 0 in that expression.
The set of BCE is illustrated in Figure 2. More prior information shrinks the set of BCE since the
obedience constraints become tighter. Once q reaches 1, the …rm knows the state and the information
designer has no ability to in‡uence the outcome. The …rm is simply pursuing the complete information
optimal decision, which is to invest in the good state, pG = 1, and not to invest in the bad state,
pB = 0.
The set of BCE across di¤erent q has two notable features. First, we notice that the set of BCE
happens to be constant across some information structures near precision q = 0:5, for example at q = 0:5
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and q = 0:6. With low precision in the signals, such as q = 0:6, the …rm would pursue the same action
for either type realization, absent any additional recommendation by the government. Thus, the weak
private information by the agent does not constrain the government in its recommendation policy. In
consequence, private information of the player only a¤ects the set of BCE if the prior information by
itself already generates a di¤erential response by the player. Second, the slope of the boundary is
constant across di¤erent levels of precision q. This occurs as the rate at which the optimal decision of
the player can be reversed by additional information of the designer (and hence indi¤erence is attained)
is constant across q by Bayes’law.
Insert Figure 2: Investment Probability with Informed Player: x = 55=100

3.3

Many Players without Prior Information

We can now generalize the analysis to two …rms and return to the assumption that the …rms have no prior
information.8 We assume for now that the government wants to maximize the sum over each individual
…rm’s probability of investment. If there is no strategic interaction between …rms, the previous analysis
can be carried out …rm by …rm and will thus be unchanged.
But we now perturb the problem to make it strategic, assuming that each …rm gets an extra payo¤
" if both invest, where " may be positive or negative. If " is positive, we have a game of strategic
complementarities, if " < 0, we have a game of strategic substitutes. We can write …rm 1’s state
dependent payo¤s for the game as follows (and symmetrically for …rm 2):
…rm 2

…rm 2
=B
…rm 1

invest

invest
not invest

not invest

1+"
0

1

…rm 1

0

=G

invest

not invest

invest

x+"

x

not invest

0

0

(12)

We can focus on symmetric decision rules, given the symmetry of the basic game, for any symmetric
objective of the information designer. To see why, note that if we found an asymmetric maximizing
decision rule, the decision rule changing the names of the …rms would also be optimal and so would the
(symmetric) average of the two decision rules. Therefore, we will continue to write p for the probability
that each …rm will invest in state
8

2 fG; Bg; but we will now write r for the probability that both

Other two player, two action and two state examples appear in Bergemann and Morris (2013a), (2016a) and Taneva

(2015).
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invest. Thus a decision rule is a vector (pB ; rB ; pG ; rG ). A decision rule can now be represented in a
table as
=B

invest

not invest

invest

rB

pB

not invest

pB

rB

=G

rB

1 + rB

2pB

invest

not invest

invest

rG

pG

not invest

pG

rG

To ensure that all probabilities are non-negative, we require that for all
max f0; 2p

1g

r

:

rG

1 + rG

(13)

2pG

2 fB; Gg :

p .

The …rm has an incentive to invest when told to invest if
1
1
1
pB + pG x + (rB + rG ) "
2
2
2

0;

(14)

and an incentive to not invest when told to not invest if
1
(1
2

pB ) +

1
(1
2

pG ) x +

1
(pB
2

rB + pG

rG ) "

0:

Since x < 1, (14) is always the binding constraint and - for j"j su¢ ciently close to 0 - we can rewrite it
by the same reasoning as in Section 3.1 as
pG

pB
x

"
(rB + rG ) .
x

(15)

Now maximizing the sum of the probabilities of each …rm investing corresponds to maximizing pB , (or
pB + pG , but we will have pG = 1 always) subject to (15). For …xed x < 1 and j"j

0, it is clearly

optimal to have …rms always invest when the state is good (so pG = 1 and rG = 1) and it is not possible
to get both …rms to always invest when the signal is bad.
If " > 0, (15) implies that it is optimal to choose rB as large as possible given pB . Thus we will set
rB = pB . Substituting these variables into expression (15), we have
1

pB
x

"
(pB + 1) ,
x

and so it is optimal to set
pB = rB =

x+"
;
1 "

and we can summarize the optimal decision rule in the following table:
=B

invest

not invest

invest

x+"
1 "

0

not invest

0

1 x 2"
1 "

=G
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invest

not invest

invest

1

0

not invest

0

0

This decision rule entails a public signal: there is common certainty among the …rms that they always
observe the same signal.
If " < 0, it remains optimal to have both …rms always invest when the state is good (pG = rG = 1).
But now we want to minimize rB given (pB ; pG ; rG ). To reduce cases, let us assume that x >
restrict attention to j"j

x

1
2.

1
2

and

In this case, it will be optimal to set rB = 0. Substituting these

expressions into (15), we have
1

pB
x

"
.
x

Thus we will now have pB = x + "; and we can summarize the optimal decision rule in the following
table:
=B

invest

not invest

invest

0

x+"

not invest

x+"

1

2x

=G

2"

invest

not invest

invest

1

0

not invest

0

0

:

Under this decision rule, …rms told to invest know neither whether the state is good or bad, nor if the
other …rm is investing or not. Thus signals are private to each …rm. Given that - in the bad state - each
…rm will invest with (roughly) probability x and will not with (roughly) probability 1

x, the above

information structure minimizes the unconditional correlation of the signals across …rms (or equivalently
minimizes the negative correlation conditional on the bad state.)
Strategic complementarities increase the private return from investing if the other player invests
as well. Below we display the set of investment probabilities that can be attained by the government
while varying the size of the strategic e¤ect ". As the strategic e¤ect " increases, the boundaries of
the investment probabilities attainable by the government shift outwards as illustrated in Figure 3. As
the strategic complementarity increases (or strategic substitutability decreases), the government can
support a larger probability of investment in both states. The intermediate case of " = 0 reduces to the
case of a single player, and hence reduces to the area depicted earlier in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 3: Investment Probability with Negative or Positive Strategic Term ",
x = 55=100.

3.4

Many Players with Prior Information

We analyzed the case of two players and prior information in Bergemann and Morris (2016a). Here, we
illustrate this case without formally describing it. As in the single player case, an increase in players’
prior information limits the ability of the designer to in‡uence the players’choices. Consequently, the
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impact of prior information on the set of attainable investment probabilities with many players is similar
to the one player case. In Figure 4 we illustrate the set of attainable investment probabilities under
increasing prior information with strategic complementarities. The strategic complementarities give rise
to a kink in the set of attainable probabilities (pB ; pG ) unlike in the single player case depicted earlier
in Figure 2.
Insert Figure 4: Investment Probability with Two Players with Prior Information,
with Strategic Term " = 3=10; x = 55=100.

4

Issues in Information Design Illustrated by the Examples

Let us draw out the signi…cance of these examples. One basic point that has been extensively highlighted
(e.g., by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and the following Bayesian persuasion literature) is that when
there is a con‡ict between the designer and the player(s), it will in general be optimal for the designer
to obfuscate, that is, hide information from the player(s) in order to induce him to make choices that
are in the designer’s interests. And conditional on obfuscation being optimal, it may not be optimal to
hide all information, but will in general be optimal to partially reveal information. This issue already
arises in the case of one player with no prior information.
In this section, we draw out a number of additional insights about information design that emerged
from the examples. First, we observe that information will be supplied to players publicly or privately
depending on whether the designer would like to induce positive or negative correlation in players’
actions; we also discuss designers’ possible intrinsic or instrumental reasons for wanting positive or
negative correlation. Second, we note that in the case of one player with prior information, more prior
information constrains the ability of the designer to control outcomes; we discuss the many player
generalization of this observation. Third, we discuss the elegant "concavi…cation" approach as an
alternative to the linear programming representation used above to characterize and provide insights
into the information designer’s problem. We also discuss an extension of the concavi…cation approach
to the many player case but note limitations of the concavi…cation approach, both in the one player
case and (even more) in the many player case.
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4.1

Public versus Private Signals; and Instrumental versus Intrinsic Motivation for
Preferences Over Correlation

An information designer will often have preferences over whether players’ actions are correlated with
each other, or not. The case of many players without prior information illustrates the point that if the
designer wants players’actions to be correlated, it will be optimal to give them public signals and if he
wants players’actions to be uncorrelated, he will give them private signals. However, there are di¤erent
reasons why the designer might want to induce positive or negative correlation in actions.
In our analysis of the case of two players without prior information, we made the assumption that
the information designer wanted to maximize the sum of the probabilities that each player invests. Thus
we assumed that the information designer did not care whether players’actions were correlated or not.
Put di¤erently, we assumed that the information designer had no intrinsic preferences over correlation.
Yet, despite this assumption we observed that the information designer wants - for instrumental reasons
- to induce correlated behavior when players’actions are strategic complements, and to induce negative
correlation when there were strategic substitutes among the players. This in turn generated the insight
that the designer would like to generate public signals when there are strategic complementarities and to
generate private signals when there are strategic substitutes. The reason for this instrumental objective
is that under strategic complements, the designer can slacken obedience constraints by correlating play,
with the opposite mechanism holding under strategic substitutes.
We now describe three environments where there will be only instrumental concerns about correlation. First, Mathevet, Perego, and Taneva (2017) consider an environment with one-sided strategic
complementarities. The designer cares about the action of a …rst player who cares about the action of
a second player who has no strategic concerns, i.e., does not care about the …rst player’s action. In
this case, the information designer does not have intrinsic preferences over correlation (because she only
cares about the …rst player’s action) but has an instrumental incentive to correlate actions because she
can use information design to in‡uence the action of the second player and correlate behavior in order
to slacken the …rst player’s obedience constraint. In the formulation of Mathevet, Perego, and Taneva
(2017), the information designer is a manager, the …rst player is a worker and the second player is a
supervisor.
Second, Bergemann and Morris (2016a) consider an environment with two sided strategic complementarities but where a non-strategic payo¤ externality removes intrinsic preferences over correlation.
To illustrate this, suppose that we take our many player with no prior information example from Section
3.3, but now suppose that - in addition to the existing payo¤s - each …rm would like the other …rm to
invest, and thus there are spillovers. In the following payo¤ table, we are assuming that each …rm gets
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an extra payo¤ of z > 0 if the other …rm invests:
=B

invest

invest
not invest

not invest

1+"+z
z

1
0

=G

invest

not invest

invest

x+"+z

x

not invest

z

0

Observe that this change in payo¤s has no impact on the …rms’best responses: neither …rm can in‡uence
whether the other …rm invests. But now suppose that the government is interested in maximizing the
sum of the …rms’payo¤s. Consider the case that z is very large. As z becomes larger and larger, the
government’s objective will approach maximizing the sum of the probabilities that each …rm invests. In
this sense, the government’s instrumental preference for correlation is micro-founded in the benevolent
government’s desire to make each …rm invest in the interests of the other …rm. This example illustrates
a distinctive point about strategic information design. Recall that in the one player case where the
designer and the player have common interests, it is always optimal for the designer to fully reveal all
information in order to allow the player to take an action that is optimal given their shared preferences.
In the many player case, however, the players themselves may not act in their joint interest for the usual
(non-cooperative strategic) reasons. In this case - as in the above example - a benevolent information
designer might want to obfuscate information.
For a last case with only instrumental concerns over correlation, Bergemann and Morris (2013b)
considered quantity (Cournot) competition in a market, where the information designer wants to maximize the sum of the …rms’payo¤s, i.e., the industry pro…ts.9 A continuum of …rms choose output where
there is uncertainty about the intercept of the demand curve, i.e., the level of demand. In this case,
the information designer would like the …rms’total output to be correlated with the level of demand,
but total pro…ts do not depend on the correlation of …rms’output conditional on the level of aggregate
output. However, …rms would like their actions to be negatively correlated (because the game is one of
strategic substitutes); but they would also like output to be correlated with the state. The information
designer can induce players to make total output choices that are closer to the optimal level but allow
them to negatively correlate their output. In the optimal outcome (for some parameters), …rms observe
conditionally independent private signals about the state of demand, trading o¤ these two objectives.10
Having considered the case where the information designer cares about correlation for instrumental
but not intrinsic reasons, we can also consider the opposite case where the information designer cares
about correlation for intrinsic but not instrumental reasons. We can illustrate this case with the example
9
10

This corresponds to a large literature on information sharing in oligopoly following Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982).
In this setting, the information designer would like to induce …rms to lower output on average, but cannot do so. The

designer can only in‡uence correlation.
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of Section 3.3 also. Suppose that the payo¤s remain the same, but now the government would like to
maximize the probability that at least one …rm invests, so that the government has intrinsic preferences
over correlation. But in this case - under our maintained assumption that x >

1
2

- it is possible to

ensure that one …rm always enters. Consider the following decision rule:
=B

invest

not invest

invest

0

1
2

not invest

1
2

0

=G

invest

not invest

invest

1

0

not invest

0

0

If " were equal to 0, this decision rule would be obedient, with all constraints holding strictly: a …rm told
to not invest would have a strict incentive to obey, since it would know that the state was bad; a …rm told
to invest would have a strict incentive to obey, since its expected payo¤ will be

2
3

x

1
2

> 0. Because

the obedience constraints hold strictly, this decision rule will continue to be obedient, for positive or
negative ", as long as j"j is su¢ ciently small. Note that the government’s objective, of maximizing the
probability that at least one …rm invests, necessitates private signals.
In a dynamic setting, Ely (2017) shows how an information designer with intrinsic preferences for
negative correlation will optimally use private signals to induce it (he also shows that this is consistent
with players’ strategic objectives). Arieli and Babichenko (2016) and Meyer (2017) provide a general
analysis of optimal information design when players have binary actions and the information designer
has an intrinsic motive for correlation, but there is no strategic interaction - and thus no instrumental
motive for caring about correlation. With supermodular payo¤s, public signals are optimal whereas
with submodular payo¤s private signals are optimal and it is optimal to minimize correlation.11

4.2

Tightening Obedience Constraints and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium Outcomes

There is never any reason for an information and/or mechanism designer to provide players with more
information than they will use in making their choices. Giving more information will impose more
incentive constraints on players’ choices, and thus reduce the ability of an information designer to
attain outcomes that are desirable for him. In dynamic mechanism design, giving players information
about others’ past reports will tighten truth-telling constraints. Myerson (1986) emphasizes that a
similar observation is true in dynamic problems of communication in games; in these games the extra
information imposes more obedience constraints as well. Recall that in our language, communication in
games corresponds to information design when the information designer has no information of her own.
11

In a recent survey on the algorithmic aspects of information design, Dughmi (2017) emphasizes how the structure

of the payo¤ environment impacts the algorithms to compute the optimal information structure and their computational
complexity.
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Our examples have illustrated this general observation: giving players more information will impose
more obedience constraints and thus reduce the set of (BCE) outcomes that can occur. However, the
examples illustrate a more subtle point that is the focus of Bergemann and Morris (2016a): it is not
only true that adding additional signals reduces the set of outcomes that can occur; it is also possible
to construct a partial order on arbitrary information structures that exactly characterizes the notion of
"more informative", and one that corresponds exactly to adding more obedience constraints.
This was illustrated in our one player example with prior information. In that example, the set
of implementable BCE outcomes shrunk in size as the accuracy q of the prior information increased
(as illustrated in Figure 2). As q increases, we are intuitively giving the player more information. The
additional information is given to the player not in the form of more signals, rather more precise signals.
We will now informally describe how this observation can be generalized in many directions. In the
one player case, an information structure reduces to an experiment in the sense of Blackwell (1951),
(1953). He de…nes the "more informative" ordering in terms of a feasibility ordering. An experiment
is said to be more informative than another experiment if the set of outcomes (joint distributions over
actions and states) that can be induced by decision rules mapping signals into actions is larger - in any
decision problem - under the …rst experiment.12
Blackwell (1951), (1953) o¤ered an alternative, entirely statistical ordering on experiments, without
reference to actions or payo¤s: one experiment is su¢ cient for another if the latter can be attained by
adding noise to the former.
We have described an incentive ordering on experiments: one experiment is more incentive constrained than another if the set of BCE outcomes under the former experiment is smaller (re‡ecting the
tighter obedience constraints) in every decision problem (or one player basic game).
Taken together, there is now an elegant set of connections between Blackwell’s theorem and the
information design problem. One can show that there is a three way equivalence between (i) the "more
informative" ordering; (ii) the "su¢ ciency" ordering; and (iii) the "incentive constrained" ordering.
Blackwell’s theorem shows an equivalence between (i) and (ii).

Thus, if an experiment is "more

informative" in the sense of Blackwell, then - in any decision problem - the set of BCE outcomes for a
given experiment is smaller under the more informative experiment. There is naturally also a converse.
If an experiment is not more informative than another, then one can …nd a decision problem and an
12

Blackwell (1951), (1953) de…nes "more informative" in terms of "risk vectors" rather than joint distributions between

states and action. These two feasibility conditions are equivalent. Blackwell de…nes as risk vector the vector of expected
payo¤s that can be sustained by a decision rule measurable with respect to the information structure alone. The resulting
payo¤ vector is however computed conditional (on the vector) of the true state. It then follows easily that a larger set of
risk vectors is sustained if and only if a larger set of joint distribution of actions and states is sustained.

24

outcome that is a BCE for the …rst experiment but not for the second.
This equivalence result holds in the one player case for general games, i.e., decision problems with
…nitely many states and actions. This result is the one player special case of the main result (for many
player information structures) from Bergemann and Morris (2016a).
The de…nition of the incentive ordering, as well as the de…nition of feasibility ordering, generalizes
naturally to the many player case. Bergemann and Morris (2016a) o¤er a new statistical ordering,
termed individual su¢ ciency, for many players, and show that is equivalent to the incentive ordering
in the many player case. Individual su¢ ciency is de…ned as follows. Fix two information structures. A
combined information structure is one where players observe a pair of signals, corresponding to the two
information structures, with the marginal on signal pro…les of each information structure corresponding
to the original information structures. Thus there are many combinations of any two information
structures, corresponding to di¤erent ways of correlating signals across the two information structures.
One information structure is now individually su¢ cient for another if there is a combined information
structure such that each player’s signal in the former information structure is a su¢ cient statistic for
his beliefs about the state of the world and others’signals in the latter information structure. A subtle
feature of this ordering is that one information structure being individually su¢ cient for another neither
implies nor is implied by the property that players’ joint information in the former case is su¢ cient
(in the statistical sense) for their joint information in the latter case. We should add that in the
special case of a single player individual su¢ ciency and su¢ ciency naturally coincide. The ordering of
individual su¢ ciency has a number of natural properties. Two information structures are individually
su¢ cient for each other if and only if they correspond to the same beliefs and higher order beliefs about
states, and di¤er only in the redundancies of the type identi…ed in Mertens and Zamir (1985). One
information structure is individually su¢ cient for another only if we can get from the latter to the
former by providing additional information and removing redundancies.
In the one player setting, there is an alternative but equivalent ordering to the feasibility ordering.
It is phrased in terms of optimality and appears more frequently in the economics rather than statistic
literature. For example, La¤ont (1989) de…nes one experiment to be "more valuable" than another
if it leads to (weakly) higher maximal expected utility for every decision problem. In a single player
problem, a larger set of feasible joint distribution clearly implies a larger maximal expected utility. Less
obvious perhaps, the converse also holds, as the ranking has to hold across all decision problems.
A common observation is that in strategic situations, there is no many player analogue to the "more
valuable" ordering: see, for example, Hirshleifer (1971), Neyman (1991), Gossner (2000), and Bassan,
Gossner, Scarsini, and Zamir (2003). The above discussion provides a novel perspective. Intuitively,
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there are two e¤ects of giving players more information in a strategic setting. First, it allows players
to condition on more informative signals, and thus - in the absence of incentive constraints - attain
more outcomes. Second, more information can reduce the set of attainable outcomes by imposing more
incentive constraints on players’behavior. The value of information in strategic situations is ambiguous
in general because both e¤ects are at work. Following Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010), we
can abstract from the second (incentive) e¤ect by focussing on common interest games. Here, more
information in the sense of individual su¢ ciency translates into more attainable outcomes. But looking
at Bayes correlated equilibria abstracts from the …rst (feasibility) e¤ect, by allowing the information
designer to supply any information to the players. Now, more information in the sense of individual
su¢ ciency translates into less attainable outcomes.

4.3

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium Outcomes
and Information Design without Concavi…cation

We have described a "two step" approach to solving information design problems. First, provide a linear
algebraic characterization of implementable outcomes, meaning the set of joint distributions over actions
and states that can be induced by some information structure that the information designer might choose
to give the players. The set of implementable outcomes is exactly the set of Bayes correlated equilibria
(BCE). Second, we select among the BCE the one that is optimal for the information designer. This
second step implicitly identi…es the optimal information structure. The …rst problem is solved by …nding
the set of outcomes that satisfy a set of linear (obedience) constraints. The second problem corresponds
to maximizing a linear objective subject to linear constraints. Both steps of this problem are well
behaved. There is a separate reason why we might pursue this two step procedure: for many questions
of interest, it is critical to …rst understand the set of BCE outcomes. The next two sub-sections describe
two contexts where the structure of the BCE outcomes is the focus of the analysis.
However, there is a di¤erent approach to information design: concavi…cation. The “concavi…cation”
approach is based on a geometric analysis of the function mapping receiver posterior beliefs to sender
payo¤s. Concavi…cation focuses more on the “experiments” or the distribution of posteriors that are
induced for the receivers rather than on the joint distribution between actions and states. In the
one person problem, we can identify the payo¤ that the information designer receives for any given
probability distribution over state, subject to the fact that the player will make an optimal choice. But
the information designer has the ability to split the player’s beliefs about the state, i.e., supply the
player with information that will induce any set of posteriors over the states of the world, subject to
the constraint that the prior over states is a convex combination of those posteriors. This implies that
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the set of attainable payo¤s for the information designer, as a function of prior distributions of states,
is the concavi…cation of the set of payo¤s of the designer in the absence of information design. This
concavi…cation argument (building on Aumann and Maschler (1995)) is the focus of both Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011) and the large and important literature inspired by their work. The many players case
is signi…cantly harder than the single player case, as it is no longer the set of probability distributions
over states that matter, but rather the set of (common prior) subsets of the universal type space of
Mertens and Zamir (1985) that are relevant for strategic analysis. Mathevet, Perego, and Taneva (2017)
describe this generalization of concavi…cation for the many player case.
Concavi…cation and its many player analogue are important for two reasons. First, they o¤er
structural insights into the information design problem. Second, they provide a method for solving
information design problems. As a solution method, the concavi…cation approach and its generalization
do not always help without some special structure. Our own work on (one player) price discrimination
discussed in the next section, Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2015), relies heavily on linear programming; but while the solution must correspond to the concavi…cation of an objective function, it is
very di¢ cult to visualize the concavi…cation or provide a proof using it. However, linear programming
methods do not always help either: in our work on (many player) auctions, Bergemann, Brooks, and
Morris (2017), neither generalized concavi…cation nor linear programming methods are used in stating
or proving our results (although linear programming played an important role in supplying conjectures
for the results).

5

Metaphorical Information Design and Applications

Mechanism design sometimes has a literal interpretation. For example - in some settings - a seller may
be able to commit to an auction for selling an object. In other settings, the mechanism design problem
is studied even though there does not exist a mechanism designer able to commit. For example, suppose
that we are interested in a buyer and seller bargaining over an object. There may be no rules for how
the players bargain and no one who could enforce such rules. Nonetheless, Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) studied what would be the optimal mechanism for realizing gains from trade, because it bounds
what could happen under any bargaining protocol that ends up being used. In this sense, there is not
a literal mechanism designer, but we are rather using the language of mechanism design for another
purpose.
Similarly for information design. The simplest interpretation of the information design problem
is that there is an actual information designer who can commit to choosing the players’ information
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structure in order to achieve a particular objective. In many contexts, this commitment assumption
may not be plausible.13 Yet, the information design perspective can be used to address many important
questions even where there is not a literal information designer. In particular, understanding the set
of outcomes that an information designer can induce corresponds to identifying the set of all outcomes
that could arise from some information structure.
In our own applications of information design, we have mostly been interested in metaphorical
interpretations. The set of Bayes correlated equilibria is precisely the set of outcomes that can arise
with extra information, for a given basic game and prior information structure. If there are properties
that hold for all Bayes correlated equilibria, we have identi…ed predictions that are robust to the exact
information structure. Identifying the best or worst outcome under some criterion that can arise under
some information structure is the same as solving an information design problem where the designer is
maximizing or minimizing that criterion. In this section, we will review two such economic applications
of information design. We will highlight the implications of this approach in the context of third degree
price discrimination (Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2015)) and a linear interaction game with a focus
on aggregate variance, and macroeconomic implications (Bergemann, Heumann, and Morris (2015)).
Caplin and Martin (2015) adopt a similar, metaphorical, approach to the recovery of preference
orderings and utility from choice data. They allow for the possibility that the decision maker has
imperfect information while satisfying Bayes law and iterated expectation. They ask what they can
learn from the observed choice data about the underlying preference pro…le without making strong
assumptions on the information available to the decision-maker at the moment of choice. In related
work, Caplin and Dean (2015) develop a revealed preference test giving conditions under which apparent
choice "mistakes" can be explained in terms of optimal costly information acquisition by the player in
the presence of imperfect information.

5.1

The Limits of Price Discrimination

A classic issue in the economic analysis of monopoly is the impact of discriminatory pricing on consumer
and producer surplus. A monopolist engages in third degree price discrimination if he uses additional
information about consumer characteristics to o¤er di¤erent prices to di¤erent segments of the aggregate
market.

Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2015) characterize what could happen to consumer and

producer surplus for all possible segmentations of the market.
One can provide some elementary bounds on consumer and producer surplus in any market segmen13

Forges and Koessler (2005) observe that conditioning on players’exogenous information makes sense if players’types

are ex post veri…able.
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tation. First, consumer surplus must be non-negative as a consequence of the participation constraint:
a consumer will not buy the good at a price above his valuation. Second, the producer must get at least
the surplus that he could get if there was no segmentation and he had no additional information beyond
the prior distribution. In this case, an optimal policy is always to o¤er the product with probability one
at a given price to all buyers. We therefore refer to it as uniform monopoly price, and correspondingly
uniform monopoly pro…t. Third, the sum of consumer and producer surplus cannot exceed the total
social value that consumers receive from the good, value minus unit cost of production. The shaded
right angled triangle in Figure 5 illustrates these three bounds.
Insert Figure 5: The Bounds on Profits and Consumer Surplus in Third Degree Price
Discrimination
The main result in Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2015) is that every welfare outcome satisfying
these constraints is attainable by some market segmentation. This is the entire shaded triangle in Figure
5. If the monopolist has no information beyond the prior distribution of valuations, there will be no
segmentation. The producer charges the optimal monopoly price, and gets the associated monopoly
pro…t, and consumers receive a positive surplus; this is marked by point A in Figure 5. If the monopolist
has complete information, then he can charge each buyer his true valuation, i.e., engage in perfect or
…rst degree price discrimination; this is marked by point B. The point marked C is where consumer
surplus is maximized; the outcome is e¢ cient and the consumer gets all the surplus gains over the
uniform monopoly pro…t.

At the point marked D, social surplus is minimized by holding producer

surplus down to uniform monopoly pro…ts and holding consumer surplus down to zero.
The main result states that we can make only very weak predictions about producer and consumer
surplus. It can be understood as the outcome of a set of metaphorical information design problems. If
an information designer wanted to maximize consumer surplus, she would choose point C. If she wanted
minimize consumer surplus, or producer surplus, or any weighted combination of the two, she could
choose point D. Any other point on the boundary of the triangle is the solution for some information
designer preferences over producer and consumer surplus.
The information design has a very clear literal interpretation in one case. If the monopolist knew the
consumer’s valuation, he can achieve perfect price discrimination at point B. However, giving a literal
information design interpretation of point C is more subtle. We would need to identify an information
designer who knew consumers’valuations and committed to give partial information to the monopolist
in order to maximize the sum of consumers’welfare. Importantly, even though the disclosure rule is
optimal for consumers as a group, individual consumers would not have an incentive to truthfully report
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their valuations to the information designer, given the designer’s disclosure rule, since they would want
to report themselves to have low values.
As discussed in the previous section, it seems hard to explain the main result using concavi…cation,
but there is an elementary geometric argument. One can show that any point where the monopolist is
held down to his uniform monopoly pro…ts with no information beyond the prior distribution— including
outcomes A, C, and D in Figure 5— can be achieved with the same segmentation. In this segmentation,
consumer surplus varies because the monopolist is indi¤erent between charging di¤erent prices.
We can use a simple example to illustrate these results. There are three valuations, v 2 V =
f1; 2; 3g, which arise in equal proportions, and there is zero marginal cost of production. The feasible
social surplus is w = (1=3) (1 + 2 + 3) = 2. The uniform monopoly price is v = 2. Under the
uniform monopoly price, pro…t is
(1=3) (2
by

= (2=3)

2 = 4=3 and consumer surplus is u = (1=3) (3

2) +

2) = 1=3. A segment x is a vector of probabilities of each valuation, thus x = (x1 ; x2 ; x3 ), and

(x) we denote the total mass of a segment x. A segmentation of the market is therefore a collection

of segments x 2 X and and a probability distribution

( ) over the segments. We give an example of

a segmentation below. In the example, there are three segments and each segment is identi…ed by its
support on the valuations indicated by the set f g in the superscript. The frequency of each segment x
is given by

(x):
Segment

x1

x2

x3

(x)

xf1;2;3g

1
2

xf2;3g

0

1
6
1
3

1
3
2
3

xf1g

0

1

0

2
3
1
6
1
6

x

1
3

1
3

1
3

1

(16)

The particular segmentation has a number of interesting properties. First, in each segment, the seller is
indi¤ erent between charging as price any valuation that is in the support of the segment. Second, the
uniform monopoly price, p = 2 is in the support of every segment. Thus this particular segmentation
preserves the uniform monopoly pro…t. If the monopolist charges the uniform monopoly price on each
segment, we get point A. If he charges the lowest value in the support of each segment (which is also
an optimal price, by construction), we get point C; and if he charges the highest value in the support,
we get point D.
Roesler and Szentes (2017) consider a related information design problem in which a single buyer can
design her own information about her value before she is facing a monopolist seller. While the analysis
of the third-degree price discrimination proceeds as a one player application, the arguments extend
to many player settings. Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2017) pursue the question of how private
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information may impacts the pricing behavior in a many buyer environment. There we derive results
about equilibrium behavior in the …rst-price auction that hold across all common-prior information
structures. The results that we obtain can be used for a variety of applications, e.g., to partially
identify the value distribution in settings where the information structure is unknown and to make
informationally robust comparisons of mechanisms.

5.2

Information and Volatility

Bergemann, Heumann, and Morris (2015) revisit a classic issue in macroeconomics. Consider an economy of interacting agents –each of whom picks an action –where the agents are subject to idiosyncratic
and aggregate shocks. A fundamental economic question in this environment is to ask how aggregate
and idiosyncratic shocks map into "aggregate volatility" - the variance of the average action.
sions of this question arise in many di¤erent economic contexts.

Ver-

In particular, a central question in

macroeconomics is how aggregate and individual productivity shocks translate into variation in GDP.
Another classical question is when and how asymmetric information can in‡uence this mapping, and in
particular exacerbate aggregate volatility.
These questions are studied in a setting with a continuum of agents whose best responses are linear in
the (expectation of the) average action of others and idiosyncratic as well as aggregate shocks. Shocks,
actions and signals are symmetrically normally distributed across agents, maintaining symmetry and
normality of the information structure. The maximal aggregate volatility is attained in an information
structure in which the agents confound idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, and display excess response
to the aggregate shocks, as in Lucas (1972) and more recently in Hellwig and Venkateswaran (2009),
Venkateswaran (2013) and Angeletos and La’O (2013). Our contribution is to highlight that, in this
setting with idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, a class of noise-free confounding information structures
are extremal and provide global bounds on how much volatility can arise. In particular, for any given
variance of aggregate shocks, the upper bound on aggregate volatility is linearly increasing in the
variance of the idiosyncratic shocks.
In this application, we do not think there is any economic agent who is able to or wants to maximize
aggregate volatility. But because we are interested in bounds in aggregate volatility across equilibria of
di¤erent information structures, the problem is naturally represented as an information design problem.
The basic setting is that the payo¤ shock

of individual i is given by the sum of an aggregate shock

i

and an idiosyncratic shock "i :
i

The aggregate shock

, + "i :

is common to all agents and the idiosyncratic shock "i is identically and inde31

pendently distributed across agents, as well as independent of the aggregate shock. Each component of
the payo¤ shock

i

is normally distributed.
0
1
@

"i

A

The variance of the individual payo¤ shock

00

N @@
i
2

the idiosyncratic and the aggregate shock:
shocks of any two agents i and j,

i

and

j

1 0
A;@

0

2

0

0
2
"

11

AA :
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can be expressed in terms of the variance of the sum of

+

2.
"

The correlation (coe¢ cient)

between the payo¤

is:
,

2
2

+

2
"

:

(18)

The best response of agent i is given by a linear function
ai = (1

r) Ei [ i ] + rEi [A] ;

where A is the average action. Now, the results described above regarding the structure of the extremal
information structure hold independently of whether the weight on the average action, r, is negative
(the strategic substitutes case), zero (the purely decision theoretic case) or positive (the strategic complementarities case).

A striking property is that the set of feasible correlations between individual

and average actions and individual and aggregate shocks is independent of r and determined only by
statistical constraints. Here we will thus convey the ‡avor of the result in a setting where the decision
of the agent is independent of any strategic considerations, thus the decision-theoretic case.
It su¢ ces to consider the following one-dimensional class of signals:
si , "i + (1

) ;

(19)

where the linear composition of the signal si is determined by the parameter
structure

2 [0; 1]. The information

is noise free in the sense that every signal si is a linear combination of the idiosyncratic and

the aggregate shock, "i and , and no extraneous noise or error term enters the signal of each agent.
Nonetheless, since the signal si combines the idiosyncratic and the aggregate shock with weights
1

and

, each signal si leaves agent i with residual uncertainty about his true individual payo¤ shock

unless

=1

i,

= 1=2.

In the decision-theoretic case, r = 0, the best response of each agent simply re‡ects a statistical
prediction problem, namely to predict the payo¤ shock
ai = E [ i jsi ] =

(1
(1

)
)2
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i

given the signal si :

+ (1
+ 2 (1

)
)

si .

(20)

The individual prediction problem is more responsive to the signal si , that is assigns a larger weight to
si if and only if the signal contains more information about the individual payo¤ shock
free information structure

i.

The noise

= 1=2 allows each agent to perfectly infer the individual payo¤ shock

It follows that the responsiveness, and hence the variance of the individual action

2
a

i.

is maximized at

= 1=2:
2
a

2

+

Now, to the extent that the individual payo¤ shocks,

i

=

2
".

and

j,

are correlated, we …nd that even though

each agent i only solves an individual prediction problem, their actions are correlated by means of the
underlying correlation of the individual payo¤ shocks, and the aggregate volatility is
2
A

=

2
a a

=

2

:

We can ask whether the aggregate volatility can reach higher levels under information structures di¤erent
from

= 1=2. As the information structure departs from

= 1=2, we necessarily introduce a bias in

the signal si towards one of the two components of the payo¤ shock

i.

its informational quality with respect to the individual payo¤ shock

i

Clearly, the signal si is losing
as

moves away from 1=2 in

either direction. Thus the individual prediction problem (20) is becoming noisier, and in consequence
the response of the individual agent to the signal si is attenuated. But a larger weight, 1

, on

the aggregate shock , may support correlation in the actions across agents, and thus support larger
aggregate volatility. As the response of the agent is likely to be attenuated, a trade-o¤ appears between
bias and loss of information. We show that the maximal aggregate volatility:
q
2
2+ 2
+
"
;
max fvar (A)g =
4
is achieved by the information structure

(21)

:

, arg max fvar (A)g =

2

+

q

2

+

2
"

1
< :
2

(22)

which biases the signal towards the aggregate shock. We can express the information structure that
maximizes the aggregate volatility in terms of the correlation coe¢ cient
p
arg max fvar (A)g =
p ,
1+2
and the maximal volatility can be expressed as:
max fvar (A)g =

1
p
1+
4
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2

2

+

2
"

:

:

Surprisingly, as we approach an environment with purely idiosyncratic shocks, the maximal aggregate
volatility does not converge to zero, rather it is bounded away from 0, and given by

2 =4.
"

Thus, the

economy can maintain a large aggregate volatility even in the presence of vanishing aggregate payo¤
shocks by confounding the payo¤ relevant information about the idiosyncratic shock with the (in the
limit) payo¤ irrelevant information about the aggregate shock.

6

Information Design with Private Information

We have thus far considered the scenario where the designer knows not only the true state

but also

the players’prior information about the state. We now consider what happens when the information
designer does not have access to players’prior information (but still can condition on the state). Here
we consider two alternative assumptions about the designer’s ability to condition recommendations on
players’prior information. If the designer can elicit the private information, then we have information
design with elicitation. If the designer cannot elicit the private information, we have information design
without elicitation.

We present a self-contained discussion of these extensions and then discuss how

- with these extensions - information design …ts into the classical mechanism design and incomplete
information correlated equilibrium literatures more broadly in Sections 6.3 and 6.4.

6.1

Players’Prior Information is not Known to the Designer

When the information designer cannot observe the players’prior information, she may or may not be
able to ask the players about it. In the case of information design with elicitation, she will be able
to condition her recommendations on the reported types. In the case of information design without
elicitation, she can only send a list of recommendations, namely one recommendation for each possible
type of the player.
In the case of information design with elicitation, the revelation principle still implies that we can
restrict attention to the case where the information sent by the information designer consists of action
recommendations. However, we will now require an incentive compatibility condition that entails truthtelling as well as obedience, so that the information designer can only condition on a player’s signal if
the player can be given an incentive to report it truthfully. Following Myerson (1991) (Section 6.3), we
can think of the information designer choosing a decision rule
player can choose a deviation

i

:T

: Ai ! Ai with the interpretation that

!

(A) but each type of each

i (ai )

player i if the information designer recommended action ai . The decision rule
if each player does not have an incentive to deviate:
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is the action chosen by
is incentive compatible

De…nition 2 (Incentive Compatible)
A decision rule

:T

!

(A) is incentive compatible for (G; S) if for each i = 1; : : : ; I and

ti 2 Ti ,

(ai ;a

(ai ;a

for all t0i 2 Ti and

X

i )2A; t

ui ((ai ; a i ); ) ((ai ; a i )j(ti ; t i ); ) ((ti ; t i )j ) ( )

i 2T

X

i; 2

ui (( i (ai ); a i ); ) ((ai ; a i )j(t0i ; t i ); ) ((ti ; t i )j ) ( )

i )2A; t i 2T i ;

i:

2

Ai ! Ai .

The displayed inequality will be referred to as player i’s type-ti incentive constraint. It ensures that
player i, after observing signal ti , …nds it optimal to report his signal truthfully and then, after observing
and updating on the information contained in the resulting action recommendation ai , …nds it optimal
to follow this recommendation. Thus it builds in both truth-telling and obedience. In addition, the
notion of incentive compatibility requires that the decision rule is immune to "double deviations" in
which the player misreports his type to be t0i (rather than ti ) and disobeys the recommendation of the
designer by choosing

i (ai )

rather than ai . Thus, incentive compatibility implies, but is not implied by,

separately requiring truthtelling and obedience.
Proposition 2 An information designer with elicitation can attain a decision rule if and only if it is
incentive compatible.
In the case of information design without elicitation, the designer cannot condition the action recommendation on the reported type, but has to o¤er a contingent recommendation, that is a vector of
action recommendations, where each individual entry is an action recommendation for a speci…c type
of the player, hence contingent on the realized type. The set of feasible recommendations to player i is
therefore given by Bi = Ai Ti . The set of player i’s contingent recommendations therefore has a typical
element
bi : Ti ! Ai :
We de…ne B =

I B
i=1 i

and let a generic element be given by b = (b1 ; : : : ; bI ) 2 B.

We are now interested in contingent action recommendations

:

!

(B) rather than action

recommendations.
De…nition 3 (Public Feasibility)
A decision rule

:T

!

(A) is publicly feasible if there exists a contingent recommendation
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:

!

(B) such that for each a 2 A, t 2 T , and

2

with (tj ) > 0,

X

(ajt; ) =

(bj ):

fb2B:b(t)=ag

In this case, we say that

is induced by .

Public feasibility is the restriction that a given players’s contingent recommendation cannot depend
on the type of the player himself nor on the types of the other players. We refer to the above requirement
as public feasibility since the recommendation vector cannot be tailored to the private information of
the player, hence only the publicly available information about the player, namely the set of possible
types and their common prior distribution; and it has to be feasible in the sense that it induces the
decision rule .14 We emphasize that each contingent recommendation bi is still communicated to each
agent i separately and privately, and thus is not public in the sense of a public announcement to all
players.
When I = 1, public feasibility is a vacuous restriction. Every decision rule
contingent recommendation

is induced by the

given by
(bj ) =

Y

(b(t)jt; ):

t2T

Under this choice of , the components b(t) of the strategy for di¤erent types t are drawn independently.
When I > 1, however, public feasibility is a substantive restriction. By recommending to a particular
player a strategy rather than an action, the designer can condition that player’s action on his type. By
judiciously choosing a distribution over B, the designer can even correlate the players’strategies. But
she cannot correlate one player’s strategy on another player’s type.
We are not interested in all contingent recommendations, but rather those that are obedient in the
sense de…ned earlier in De…nition 1. Below we adapt the de…nition to account for the larger space of
contingent recommendations, b, rather than action recommendations, a.
De…nition 4 (Publicly Feasible Obedience)
A decision rule
mendation
14

:

:T
!

!

(A) is publicly feasible obedient if there exists a contingent recom-

(B) such that (i)

induces , and (ii)

satis…es obedience in the sense that for

Kolotilin, Li, Mylovanov, and Zapechelnyuk (2017) o¤er a related interpretation when they distinguish between "pub-

lic" versus "private" persuasion. If there is continuum population of ex ante identical players (without strategic interaction)
and the types then correspond to individuals in the population, "public" persuasion refers to the setting when all types
receive the same, hence public recommendation, one that is again typically a vector.
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each i = 1; : : : ; I, ti 2 Ti , and bi 2 Bi ,
b

b

X

i 2B i ;t i 2T i ;

X

i 2B i ;t i 2T i ;

ui ((bi (ti ); b i (t i )); ) ((bi ; b i )j ) ((ti ; t i )j ) ( )
2

ui ((a0i ; b i (t i )); ) ((bi ; b i )j ) ((ti ; t i )j ) ( )
2

for all a0i 2 Ai .
The displayed inequality will be referred to as player i’s (ti ; bi )-publicly feasible obedience constraint.
It ensures that player i, after observing signal ti and receiving and updating on the recommendation bi ,
…nds it optimal to take the action bi (ti ) prescribed by the vector bi for his type ti . Note that in so far
as a contingent recommendation bi reveals more information about the state
indirectly about the type pro…le t

i

and thus possibly and

than just an action recommendation, publicly feasible obedience

will be a more demanding concept than mere obedience as it allows the agents to contemplate deviations
based on more accurate information. After all, type ti is able to observe the recommendation tailored
towards him as well as the recommendation o¤ered to all other types t0i 6= ti . To the extent that
the recommendation across types is not perfectly correlated, it then follows that the type ti will receive
additional information through the contingent recommendation rather than the action recommendation.
Proposition 3 An information designer without elicitation can attain a decision rule if and only if it
is publicly feasible obedient.

6.2

The Investment Example Re-Visited

We reconsider the investment example introduced earlier in Section 3 but now allow the …rm’s information to be private. The government does not know the realization of the signal that the …rm observes
but can or cannot elicit it.
6.2.1

Information Design with Elicitation

In the case of elicitation, we have a screening problem where the designer o¤ers a recommendation which
induces a probability of investing as a function of the reported signal and the true state. As noted above,
we have three sets of constraints that need to be satis…ed. First, each type has to truthfully report his
signal; second, each type has to be willing to follow the recommendation, the obedience constraints;
and third, double deviations, by means of misreporting and disobeying at the same time must not be
pro…table. Kolotilin, Li, Mylovanov, and Zapechelnyuk (2017) refer to this informational environment
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as "private persuasion".15 Kolotilin (2017) pursues a linear programming approach to identify the
optimal information disclosure policy under a single-crossing assumption.
A decision rule now speci…es the probability of investment p

t

conditional on the true state

2

fB; Gg and the reported type t 2 fb; gg. Thus, as before in Section 3.2, a decision rule is now a
vector p = (pBb ; pBg ; pGb ; pGg ). The information designer o¤ers a recommendation (stochastically) as a
function of the true state and the reported type. The obedience conditions are as in Section 3.2 where
information was not private. A truthful reporting constraint is described below for a good type t = g.
The truthtelling constraint for the good type t = g is:
qpGg x

(1

q) pBg

qpGb x

(1

q) pBb

(23)

qpBg :

(24)

and correspondingly for the bad type t = b :
(1

q) pGb x

qpBb

(1

q) pGg x

By misreporting and then following the resulting recommendation afterwards, each type can change the
probability of investing. We can write the above two truthtelling constraints in terms of a bracketing
inequality:
1

q
q

x (pGg

pGb )

(pBg

pBb )

q
1

q

x (pGg

pGb ) :

(25)

These inequalities highlight how the di¤erential between type t = b and t = g in the recommendation
pBt in the bad state are bounded, below and above, by the di¤erential in the recommendation pGt in
the good state. Notice also that since
1

q1
q
<
x;
q x
1 q

the above bracketing inequality requires that
(pGg

pGb )

0; (pBg

pBb )

0;

thus the conditional probability of investing has to be larger for the good type than the bad type in
either state. An implication speci…c to the binary action, binary state environment is the fact that
15

Bergemann, Bonatti, and Smolin (2017) consider a model of private persuasion with quasilinear utility. Their main

objective is to analyze the revenue maximizing solution to the information design problem subject to the elicitation
constraints. Daskalakis, Papadimitriou, and Tzamos (2016) also consider an information design with quasilinear utility.
The novel aspect of their analysis is that the object for sale has many attributes, and the seller chooses optimally how
much to disclose about each individual attribute. Their analysis reveals a close relationship to the classic bundling problem
of a mult-item monopolist.
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double deviations do not impose any additional restriction on the behavior of the player. We state and
prove this results formally in the appendix as Proposition 6.
With these additional constraints, the set of outcomes that can arise in equilibrium under information
design with elicitation is weakly, and typically strictly, smaller than under an omniscient designer, i.e.,
the case in the previous section where the designer knows the players’prior information. The truthtelling
constraints impose restrictions on how the di¤erences in the conditional probabilities across types can
vary across states. These impose additional restrictions on the ability of the government to attain either
very low or very high investment probabilities in both states as highlighted by equation (25).
Figure 6 illustrates the case where x = 0:9 and q = 0:7; the dark red region corresponds to the
outcomes that can arise under information design with elicitation; adding in the pink region, we get
back to the triangle that corresponds to omniscient information design where the designer knows players’
prior information.
Insert Figure 6: Investment Probability with Private Information.

6.2.2

Information Design without Elicitation

We could also consider a government, who does not know the signal of the …rm and cannot even elicit
it. Kolotilin, Li, Mylovanov, and Zapechelnyuk (2017) call this scenario "public persuasion." Such
information design without elicitation has been the focus of the recent literature.
Clearly, the designer can replicate any decision rule without elicitation with a decision rule with
elicitation. This inclusion holds without any restrictions on the state space, the number of players, or
the players’actions. In the speci…c investment example above, with a single player, two states, and two
actions, the converse happens to be true as well. That is, the information designer can attain any decision
rule with elicitation with one that does not use elicitation. In other words, in the binary setting and
with a single player, there is no need for elicitation. The designer can induce any incentive compatible
decision rule by recommendations alone. We state and prove these two results in the appendix as
Proposition 5 and 6.16
The equivalence breaks down immediately if either of the binary assumptions regarding action and
state are relaxed, or we consider more than one player. We illustrate this failure of the equivalence result
16

Kolotilin, Li, Mylovanov, and Zapechelnyuk (2017) showed such an equivalence under a di¤erent set of assumptions.

In their model, the designer and the player are privately informed about distinct payo¤ states rather than having distinct
information about the same state as in the present setting.
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with a minor generalization of the investment example. In particular, in a single player environment,
we allow the player to either consider a small or a large investment. For completeness, we present
examples where one of the other two hypotheses fails in the appendix. This modi…ed example allows us
to …nd a strict nesting of the set of outcomes without prior information, with prior information and an
omniscient designer, with elicitation and …nally without elicitation. For the purpose of this example, it
will be su¢ cient to focus on the case of a single player.
6.2.3

Beyond the Binary Setting

Consider the basic investment example with I = 1,

= fB; Gg, uniform prior, and symmetric types

that are correct with probability q > 1=2. We now add an additional investment decision, to invest
small, to the set of feasible actions of the player. The decision to invest small comes with a higher
rate of return but smaller total return than the (regular) investment decision. The payo¤ from a small
investment is

1=2 in the bad state and y 2 (x=2; x) in the good state:
bad state B

good state G

invest

1

x

invest small

1
2

y

not invest

0

0

For simplicity we restrict attention to decision rules that put zero probability on the small investment
in equilibrium. We note that the small investment decision still plays a role in the characterization
of incentive compatible decision rules as it is a feasible action to the player. It will hence generate
additional obedience constraints that the designer has to respect as the player has now two possible
deviations from the recommended action, one of which is to invest at a small scale. The decision rules
–restricted to invest and not invest –can still be represented by a vector p t = (pBb ; pBg ; pGb ; pGg ) that
records the probability of investing.
As a benchmark, …rst suppose the player has no prior information. Then a decision rule that never
recommends the small investment can be represented as a pair (pB ; pG ) 2 [0; 1]2 that speci…es the
probability of the large investment in each state. When the …rm has no prior information, there are two
binding obedience constraints, one for the big investment against the small investment:
pG x

pB

pG y
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1
pB ;
2

(26)

and one for the no investment against the small investment:17
0

(1

pG )y

1
(1
2

pB ) :

(27)

The equilibrium regions are depicted in Figure 7. If the …rm has no prior information, the government
faces only the above two constraints. The set of attainable decision rules is described by the light red
area. In contrast to the setting with two investment levels analyzed earlier, there is now a kink in the
area of attainable decision rule that re‡ects a change in the binding obedience constraint, from zero
investment to small investment.
If we consider the case in which the …rm has prior information, then we have three di¤erent communication protocols for the government. An omniscient designer faces the obedience constraints that we
analyzed earlier in Section 3.2. By contrast, if the …rm holds private information, then the information
designer is no longer omniscient. Now the …rm has two possible ways to disobey. If the government
does not observe the signal, but can elicit the information from the …rm then we have truthtelling
constraints as described by (23) and (24) in addition to the obedience constraints. Importantly, in this
setting with more than two actions, the possibility of double deviations, misreporting and disobeying,
generates additional constraints on the incentive compatible decision rules.
Finally, a designer without elicitation faces additional obedience constraints that rule out deviations
conditional on a particular vector recommendation. The corresponding areas in Figure 7 illustrate
that the sequence of additional constraints from omniscient to elicitation to no elicitation imposing
increasingly more restrictions on the government and hence generate a sequence of strictly nested sets.
We already discussed how these three regimes o¤er an increasing number of constraints. It remains
to discuss the speci…c impact of being able to elicit (or not) the private information. With elicitation,
the player only learns the designer’s recommendation for one type, namely the type that he reports.
But a designer who cannot elicit must reveal her action recommendations for all types, hence the
contingent recommendation. This enables a player to contemplate additional contingencies and hence
deviations. With three possible actions, as in this example, there are two additional deviations that
take advantage of this …ner information. In particular, the high type can disobey the recommendation
to invest by deviating to invest small only when the designer also recommends not to invest to the low
type. Likewise, the low type can disobey the recommendation not to invest by deviating to invest small
only when the designer also recommends investing to the high type. The additional options for the
player induce further constraints on the information designer. Naturally, these additional deviations
17

The other two possible incentive constraints, namely for the big investment recommendation not to invest all, and for

no investment recommendation to invest big are supplanted by the above two.
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were not available in the binary action environment. And in fact the absence of this large set of
deviations accounts for the equivalence between elicitation and no elicitation in the binary action and
state environment.18
We conclude with a few observations about the comparative statics with respect to the information
structure. As the precision of the information q decreases towards 1=2, the inner three regions expand
outwards and converge to the no prior information equilibrium set. By contrast, as the precision q
increases towards 1, the three inner regions contract and converge to the singleton (0; 1).
Insert Figure 7: Investment Probability under Different Information Design
Scenarios.

6.3

Information Design and the Relation to Mechanism Design

In the information design problem, the "information designer" can commit to providing information to
the players to serve his ends, but has no ability to change the "mechanism" (or force the players to
take particular action choices). A mechanism here describes the set of players, their available actions
and a mapping from action pro…les to outcomes. Contrast this "information design" problem with the
basic "mechanism design" problem, where a "mechanism designer" can commit to a mechanism for the
players to serve his ends, but has no ability to provide the players with any additional information (or
force the players to make particular action choices).
This narrow de…nition of mechanism design assumes that players have no control over their actions
and that the mechanism designer has no information of her own to provide to the players. Myerson
(1982) describes a class of Bayes incentive problems, which constitutes a very broad de…nition of mechanism design (see also Myerson (1987) and Myerson (1994)). In this broad vision, players may have
control over some actions a¤ecting outcomes but the mechanism designer may be able to commit to
pick other outcomes as a function of the players’ reports. For example, in many classical mechanism
design problems with individual rationality constraints, players do have control over some actions: participation versus non-participation. And even if the mechanism designer may not have any information
that is unavailable to the players, he can - via the mechanism - implicitly control the information that
players have about each other. Myerson (1991) then labels the case where the mechanism designer has
18

We mentioned earlier that double deviations were not relevant in the binary environment in the sense that they do not

add additional restrictions. This changes in the richer environment here where the communicating designer indeed faces
additional restrictions coming from the possibility of double deviations.
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no direct control over outcomes "Bayesian games with communication" (Section 6.3); and the setting
where the designer has complete control over outcomes "Bayesian collective choice problems" (Section
6.4). Thus what we are calling information design corresponds to Myerson’s Bayesian games with communication with the proviso that the mediator brings his own information to the table, rather than
merely re-distributing others’information.
There is also an important literature on informed players who can commit to choosing outcomes as
a function of messages, where they are called informed principals (Myerson (1983)). But in this setting,
the information designer (principal) is typically assumed to be able to commit to a mechanism but can
do so only after receiving his information; players do not interact strategically; and the principal is
choosing the contract/mechanism; see Mylovanov and Troeger (2012), (2014) and Perez-Richet (2014)
for recent contributions. By contrast, we have a principal who cannot pick a contract/mechanism but
can commit to a disclosure rule prior to observing her information, in an environment with multiple
players interacting strategically.

6.4

Correlated Equilibrium and Incomplete Information

Aumann (1987) introduced correlated equilibrium as a solution concept for game of complete information. He showed that the set of correlated equilibria equalled the set of distributions over actions
that could arise in a Bayes Nash equilibrium if players observed some additional payo¤-irrelevant signals
(consistent with the common prior). Equivalently, the set of correlated equilibria corresponds to the set
of outcomes that could be induced by an (uninformed) information designer. What we are calling "information design" thus corresponds to an incomplete information elaboration of this original rationale
for thinking about correlated equilibrium when the information designer has information of her own.19
In this section, we review the existing literature on incomplete information correlated equilibrium to
relate it to the version of incomplete information correlated equilibrium - Bayes correlated equilibrium
- that is relevant for information design.
While Aumann (1987) provides an information design foundation for complete information correlated equilibrium, he o¤ers a broader interpretation of the characterization, arguing that correlated
equilibrium captures the implications of common knowledge of rationality in a complete information
game, under the common prior assumption.20 A large literature on the epistemic foundations of game
19

Bergemann and Morris (2017) consider foundations for other solution concepts based on informational robustness and

information design considerations, when the common prior assumption is not maintained.
20
Hillas, Kohlberg, and Pratt (2007) propose a related alternative foundation for correlated equilibrium. Consider an
external observer who observes an in…nite sequence of plays of a complete information game, has exchangeable beliefs
about them, but does not believe he can o¤er bene…cial advice to players on how to improve their payo¤s. This observer
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theory has developed since then (Dekel and Siniscalchi (2014)), elaborating on the formal language and
questions suggested by Aumann’s work, although focussed on the case of complete information without
the common prior assumption. Formal treatment of the implications of common knowledge of rationality and the common prior assumption under incomplete information ties in with many of the issues
discussed in this survey; we will discuss one issue that arises in this case in the next subsection.
To understand the literature on incomplete information correlated equilibrium, it is useful to identify
two kinds of constraints in the literature on incomplete information correlated equilibrium: feasibility
conditions (constraints on what kind of information decision rules can condition on) and incentive compatibility conditions (what decision rules are consistent with optimal behavior). In the paper so far,
we have introduced one feasibility condition - public feasibility (De…nition 3); and three incentive constraints, obedience (De…nition 1), incentive compatibility (De…nition 2) and publicly feasible obedience
(De…nition 4). Recall that Bayes correlated equilibrium - our characterization of outcomes that can be
induced by an omniscient information designer - imposed only obedience. We will discuss two further
feasibility conditions to provide an overview of correlated equilibrium with incomplete information.
6.4.1

Belief Invariance

Consider the requirement that the information designer can correlate players’ actions, but without
changing players’beliefs and higher order beliefs about the state of the world. This is formalized as:
De…nition 5 (Belief Invariant)
Decision rule

: T

!

(A) is belief invariant for (G; S) if,

of t i , where
i (ai j (ti ; t i ) ;

for each t

i

),
a

X

i 2A i

i (ai j (ti ; t i ) ;

i ((ai ; a i ) j (ti ; t i ) ;

) is independent

)

2 T i.

We then say that a decision rule is a belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibrium if it satis…es belief
invariance and obedience. It is not obvious how this feasibility condition arises under an information
design interpretation: if the designer can condition his information on , why not allow him to change
beliefs and higher order beliefs?
There are couple of conceptual reasons why one might nonetheless be interested in belief invariant
BCE. First, Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007) introduced the solution concept of interim correlated
rationalizability. They show that it characterizes the implications of common certainty of rationality
must believe that play corresponds to a correlated equilibrium.
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and players’ beliefs and higher order beliefs. The solution concept by construction imposes belief
invariance.

Liu (2015) observes that the set of interim correlated rationalizable actions corresponds

to the set of actions that can be played in a correlated equilibrium with incomplete information and
subjective priors.

If then the common prior assumption is imposed, this corresponds to the set of

belief invariant Bayes correlated equilibria. Thus the solution concept of belief invariant BCE is the
"right" one for understanding the implications of common knowledge assumptions under the common
prior assumption.
Second, Mathevet, Perego, and Taneva (2017) consider a situation where the information designer
can convey information only about beliefs and higher-order beliefs, but is not able to send additional
information about correlation. Now the set of belief invariant BCE once some higher-order belief
information has been sent is equal to the set of BCE. Bergemann and Morris (2016a) describe how
an arbitrary information structure can be decomposed into information about beliefs and higher-order
beliefs and additional belief-invariant signals.
6.4.2

Join Feasibility

Twenty …ve years ago, Forges (1993) (see also Forges (2006)) gave an overview of incomplete information
correlated equilibrium. A maintained assumption in that literature was that the information designer (or
"mediator") did not bring any information of her own to the table, but simply re-arranged information,
telling players privately about others’information. This can be formalized as:
De…nition 6 (Join Feasibility)
Decision rule
ajt;

0

:T

! A is join feasible for (G; S) if

for each t 2 T , a 2 A, and ;

0

2

(ajt; ) is independent of , i.e.,

(ajt; ) =

.

Thus join feasibility allows the designer to use the join of the private information of all the players,
the information contained in the entire type pro…le t. At the same time, it requires that the information
designer can send information only about the type pro…le of the players and thus can only condition on
the type pro…le, and not on the state of the world

or

0

. Join feasibility is imposed implicitly in some

work on incomplete information correlated equilibrium - Forges (1993) integrates out uncertainty other
than the players’types - but explicitly in others, e.g., Lehrer, Rosenberg, and Shmaya (2010).
As noted in the introduction, information design adds to the old incomplete information correlated
literature the twist that the designer brings information of her own to the table. In turn, this allows
the designer to choose the optimal design and provision of the information to the players.
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Forges’1993 paper was titled "Five Legitimate De…nitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Incomplete
Information Games". The feasibility and incentive conditions described so far allow us to completely
describe the …ve solution concepts she discusses:
1. A Bayesian solution is a decision rule satisfying join feasibility and obedience.
2. A belief invariant Bayesian solution is a decision rule satisfying join feasibility, belief invariance
and obedience.
3. An agent normal form correlated equilibrium is a decision rule satisfying join feasibility, public
feasibility (which implies belief invariance) and obedience.
4. A communication equilibrium is a decision rule satisfying join feasibility and incentive compatibility (which implies obedience)
5. A strategic form correlated equilibrium is a decision rule satisfying join feasibility and publicly
feasible obedience (which implies belief invariance, public feasibility, obedience and incentive compatibility).
Thus the Bayesian solution, communication equilibrium and strategic form correlated equilibrium
correspond to omniscient information design, information design with elicitation and information design
without elicitation, respectively. The belief invariant Bayesian solution and the agent normal form
correlated equilibrium do not have natural information design interpretations.
Forges (1993) noted inclusions implied by these de…nitions. In particular, if we write (n) for the set
of incomplete information correlated equilibria of type n above, we have
(5)

(3)

(2)

(5)

(4)

(1)

(1) and

Forges (1993) reports examples showing that these inclusions are the only ones that can be shown, i.e.,
there exist decision rules that (i) are Bayesian solutions but not belief invariant BCE or communication
equilibria; (ii) are belief invariant Bayes solutions but not communication equilibria or agent normal
form correlated equilibria; (iii) are communication equilibria but not belief invariant Bayesian solutions;
(iv) are belief invariant Bayesian solutions and communication equilibria but not agent normal form
equilibria; (v) are agent normal form correlated equilibria but not communication equilibria; (vi) are
agent normal form correlated equilibria and communication equilibria.
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Forges (1993) discusses one more solution concept: the universal Bayesian solution. The universal
Bayesian solutions corresponds - in our language - to the set of Bayes correlated equilibria that would
arise under join feasibility if players had no information.

7

Information Design with Adversarial Equilibrium
and Mechanism Selection

We have so far examined settings where the revelation principle holds: we can without loss of generality
assume that the set of signals, or types, is equal to the set of actions. We now consider two natural
extensions of information design where the revelation principle breaks down.

7.1

Adversarial Equilibrium Selection

In Section 2, it was implicitly assumed that the information designer could, having designed the information structure, also select the equilibrium to be played. With one player the equilibrium selection
problem reduces to breaking ties and is not of substantive interest. However, Carroll (2016) and Mathevet, Perego, and Taneva (2017) highlighted that this issue is of …rst order importance in the many
player case, and that the revelation principle argument breaks down and alternative arguments must be
used; Mathevet, Perego, and Taneva (2017) formalize and analyze the case where players with no prior
information will choose the worst equilibrium for the designer.
For our representation, we de…ne a "communication rule" for the information designer. Players
have the prior information encoded in the information structure S =

(Ti )Ii=1 ;

designer sends each player i an extra message mi 2 Mi , according to rule
M = M1

MI . A communication rule is then C =

(Mi )Ii=1 ;

:T

. The information
!

(M ), where

. Now the basic game G, the

prior information structure S and the communication rule C describe a Bayesian game (G; S; C).21 A
strategy for player i in this game is a mapping bi : Ti

Mi !

(Ai ). A communication rule C and

strategy pro…le b will now induce a decision rule
(ajt; ) =

X

m2M

0

(mjt; ) @

Y

i=1;:::;I

1

bi (ai jti ; mi )A .

We will write E (C) for the set of Bayes Nash equilibria of the game with communication rule C. We
can now give a more formal statement of Proposition 1:
21

Bergemann and Morris (2016a) call the pair (S; C) an "expanded information structure".
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Proposition 4
Decision rule

is a Bayes correlated equilibrium of (G; S) if and only if there exists a communica-

tion rule C and a Bayes Nash equilibrium b 2 E (C) which induce .
This is a revelation principle argument that was formally stated as Theorem 1 in Bergemann and
Morris (2016a).
Recall that in Section 2, we de…ned the information designer’s utility from BCE :
V ( )=

X

( ) (tj ) (ajt; ) v (a; ) .

;t;a

We can also de…ne the information designer’s utility from communication rule C and strategy pro…le b:
0
1
X
X
Y
V (C; b) =
( ) (tj ) @
(mjt; )
bi (ai jti ; mi )A v (a; ) .
m2M

;t;a

i=1;:::;I

Let us consider the problem of an information designer who can pick both the communication rule and
the equilibrium and is thus solving the problem
max max V (C; b) .
C

b2E(C)

Proposition 4 established that

max max V (C; b) = max V ( ) .
C

2BCE

b2E(C)

But one could also consider the problem of an information designer who can pick the communication
rule but wants to maximize his utility in the worst equilibrium and is thus solving the problem
max min V (C; b) .22
C

b2E(C)

We now discuss three applications where maxmin information design problems have been motivated
and studied; in each application, players have prior information.

First, Carroll (2016) considers the

problem of bilateral trade where he wants to know the worst possible gains from trade for a given
distribution over the known private values of a buyer and a seller. If we picked the worst equilibrium we
could always support no trade with probability one, so instead he considers the best equilibrium. This is
equivalent to having an information designer pick an information structure to maximize the ine¢ ciency
of trade anticipating that the buyer and seller will play an equilibrium that minimizes ine¢ ciency (i.e.,
maximizes the gains from trade).
22

Of course, the minmax problem min max V (C; b). is a reinterpretation of maxmin problem where objective is
C b2E(C)

replaced by

V (C; b). The minmin problem is similarly a reinterpretation of the maxmax problem.
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Second, Inostroza and Pavan (2017) consider global game models of regime change, and the problem
of an information designer trying to minimize the probability of regime change (they are motivated by
the design of stress tests to minimize the probability of a run on a bank). What information should
the information designer send - as a function of the state and players’initial information - to minimize
the probability of a run (they call this scenario "discriminatory" because the information designer can
condition on players’ prior information)? As in Carroll’s bilateral trade problem, the problem is not
interesting if the designer is able to pick the equilibrium as well as the information structure: in this
case, he can prevent the possibility of ine¢ cient outcomes by creating common knowledge of payo¤s and
picking the good equilibrium. To make the problem interesting, they then study the maxmin problem.
Finally, a literature on robustness to incomplete information (Kajii and Morris (1997)) can be
understood as an information design problem with adversarial equilibrium selection. We will give an
example to illustrate this connection.23 We will consider a slightly adapted version of the incomplete
information investment game discussed earlier with payo¤s:
=B

invest

invest

x; x

not invest

0; 1

not invest

=G

1; 0
0; 0

invest

not invest

invest

x; x

x; 0

not invest

0; 1

0; 0

for some 0 < x < 1, and the probability of state G is ", and " is small. Assume that the prior information
is that player 1 knows the state and player 2 knows nothing. Thus player 1 has a dominant strategy to
invest in state G, while there are multiple equilibria in the complete information game corresponding
to state B. In this setting, we can study the standard information design (with prior information)
described above. Suppose that the information designer wants to maximize the probability that at least
one player invests. Maintaining the assumption that the designer can pick the equilibrium, the answer
is trivial: the information designer can simply give the players no additional information and there will
be an equilibrium where players always invest.
But what if the information designer anticipated that the worst equilibrium would be played? This
is an information design with adversarial equilibrium selection. What information structure would
the information designer choose and what would be the induced probability that at least one player
invests? It is convenient to describe information structures using the language of partitions. Consider
the information structure with state space

= f1; 2; :::; ::; 1g where player 1 observes the partition

(f1g ; f2; 3g ; f4; 5g ; :::; f1g) and player 2 observes the partition (f1; 2g ; f3; 4g ; :::; f1g). Let payo¤s
be given by
23

= G at state 1 and by

= B everywhere else. For some q > 21 , let the probability of

See also Hoshino (2017) on this connection.
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state ! 6= 1 be "

1 q
q

!

and so the probability of state 1 is 1

q
2q 1 "

(if " is su¢ ciently small).

This information structure could arise from the prior information described above (only player 1 can
distinguish between states B and G) and communicating additional information.
q>

1
1+x ;

Now suppose that

this condition implies that a player assigning probability q to the other player investing will

always have a strict incentive to invest. Following the induction argument of Rubinstein (1989), invest
is the unique rationalizable action for both players at all states ! 6= 1. To see this observe that at
state 1, player 1 has a dominant strategy to invest. Now player 2 with information set f1; 2g must have
a best response to invest, since he attaches probability q to player 1 investing. Now suppose that we
have established that both players are investing at information sets of the form f!; ! + 1g if !

k.

Now consider the player with information set fk + 1; k + 2g. He attaches probability q to the other
player being at information set fk; k + 1g and therefore investing. So the player with information set
fk + 1; k + 2g will invest. This argument establishes that it is possible to ensure that - if " is su¢ ciently
small - both players invest with probability

q
2q 1 ".

Since this is true for any q >

1
1+x ,

it implies that it

is possible to get both players to invest with probability arbitrarily close to
1= (1 + x)
1
"=
".
2= (1 + x) 1
1 x
The information structure we used to get arbitrarily close to this bound was (countably) in…nite, but
we can also get arbitrarily close using …nite information structures. Arguments from Kajii and Morris
(1997) imply that this information structure is (arbitrarily close to) optimal for the information designer
in this problem. To get a ‡avor of the argument, say that a player p-believes an event if he attaches
probability at least p to the event occurring, and that there is common p-belief of that event if each
player p-believes it, each player p-believes that both p-believe it, and so on. One can show that not
invest is rationalizable only if there is common
x < 1,
least 1

x
1+x

>

1
2

x
1+x -belief

that payo¤s correspond to state B. But since

and one can show that if the event that payo¤s are given by state B has probability at

", then - for su¢ ciently small " - the ex ante probability that there is common

the state is B is at least 1

1
1 x ".

x
1+x -belief

that

This establishes that the bound is tight. If x > 1, similar arguments

can be used to show that the information designer can ensure that both players invest with probability
1.
Arguments from Kajii and Morris (1997) and the follow up literature (Ui (2001) and Morris and Ui
(2005)) can be used to analyze maxmin payo¤s more generally when - as in the above example - the
incomplete information game has each player either knowing that payo¤s are given by a …xed complete
information game or having a dominant strategy.
It is worth emphasizing that the above de…nition of the max min problem, and all the three applica50

tions, correspond to the omniscient case where the information designer can condition on players’prior
information as well as on the state. An alternative case that has been studied is when the information
designer can only send public signals and only condition on the state (and not players’prior information). Goldstein and Huang (2016) and Inostroza and Pavan (2017) have studied this problem in global
game models of regime change (Inostroza and Pavan (2017) call this the non-discriminatory case to
contrast with the discriminatory case described above). This case can be illustrated by our example
above. An information designer interested in maximizing the probability of both investing would send
a public signal to invest always if the state was good and with probability

"
1 "x

if the state was bad.

This would make player 2 indi¤erent between investing and not investing if he got the "invest" signal.

7.2

Adversarial Mechanism Selection

We considered an information designer who was choosing additional information for the players, holding
…xed the basic game and players’prior information. But what if the information designer had to pick the
information structure not knowing what the basic game, or mechanism, was going to be? In particular,
suppose that the choice of mechanism was adversarial. Again, we will lose the revelation principle.
Once the information designer has picked the information structure (and thus the set of signals), the
adversarial mechanism designer could pick a mechanism with a di¤erent set of messages.
Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2016a) consider the problem of an information designer picking
an information structure for a set of players with a common value of an object to minimize revenue,
anticipating that an adversarial mechanism designer will then pick a mechanism to maximize revenue
(a minmax problem). This gives an upper bound on the revenue of the seller of a single object who
is picking a mechanism anticipating that the worst information structure will be chosen (a maxmin
problem). Du (2016) constructs elegant bounds for the latter problem and shows that these bounds are
sharp in the limit as the number of bidders increases. The former establishes the equivalence between
minmax and maxmin exactly when there are two bidders and when the support of the value is binary,
and the latter solves the auction design problem in the limit when the number of bidders goes to in…nity.
In a recent paper Brooks and Du (2017) provide a general solution to the common value auction problem
with a general common prior and a …nite number of bidders. Both problems are studied without the
common prior assumption by Chung and Ely (2007).
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Conclusion

We have provided a uni…ed perspective for a rapidly expanding literature on Bayesian persuasion and
information design. We have highlighted a duality with mechanism design: in mechanism design, a
mechanism is picked for a given information structure, while in information design, an information
structure is picked for a given mechanism. In contrast with the recent literature on Bayesian persuasion
that is concerned with a single player (receiver), we emphasized the implications of information design
for many player strategic environments. We presented a two step approach to information design:
…rst identify the set of attainable outcomes by means of some information structure; then identify the
optimal information structure. We have described the close connection between information design and
the earlier literature on correlated equilibrium with incomplete information; but whereas players are
receiving real payo¤ relevant information in the information design problem, in the older correlated
equilibrium literature, the designer (mediator) was merely providing correlating devices.
We have drawn a sharp contrast between information design and mechanism design. But - as argued
in Myerson (1982) and Myerson (1987) and discussed in Section 6.3 - there are settings where a designer
can control some outcomes (as a function of players’messages), but cannot control others and then can
only use information to in‡uence the outcomes outside her control. As one moves into dynamic settings,
the overlap becomes more central, as in Calzolari and Pavan (2006b) and Bergemann and Pesendorfer
(2007). A speci…c setting where the interaction between mechanism design and information design has
recently been studied is the area of markets with resale in which the information disclosed in the …rst
stage fundamentally a¤ects the interaction in the resale market, see for example Calzolari and Pavan
(2006a), Dworczak (2016), Carroll and Segal (2016) and Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2016b).
The information design problem - whether literal or metaphorical - identi…es a mapping from the
economic environment to possible outcomes, allowing for di¤erent choices of information structures.
There is a second, reverse use, of information design for robust identi…cation, identifying a mapping
from outcomes to possible parameters of the economic environment, allowing that di¤erent information
structures might have generated the data.24 For example, in an auction setting, one might consider
a sample of bids from a sequence (or cross-section) of independent auctions. We can then ask what
can we infer about the underlying distribution of valuations under weak assumption on the information
structure, that is without assuming a speci…c information structure. Syrgkanis, Tamer, and Ziani (2017)
pursue such an approach for inference and identi…cation in an auction setting. Magnol… and Roncoroni
(2017) adopt a similar perspective in the analysis of discrete games, in particular entry and exit games.
24

This reverse use is exposited in Bergemann and Morris (2012).
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Many interesting avenues remain open in information design. There are many open methodological
questions. The concavi…cation approach has been very in‡uential in the single player (receiver) setting,
it is natural to ask if it can be as useful in the many player setting. In either the linear programming
or the concavi…cation approach, the optimal information structure is identi…ed by a global optimization
problem. It might be insightful to …nd a more local approach that could identify the direction of
valuable information provision. We brie‡y mentioned a number of applications of information design
in the introduction. Digital information is becoming widely used in the allocation and distribution of
services and commodities, as in tra¢ c navigation apps such as Waze or Google Maps, recommender
systems used by Net‡ix and Amazon, or service platforms such as Uber or OpenTable. This suggests
that information design will naturally be part of the solution of large class of allocation problems. To
the extent that the relevant information is arriving sequentially and improving over time, the resulting
models will likely incorporate and address dynamic aspects.
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Appendix

Additional Computation for Section 3.2 We observed in Section 3.1 that absent any additional
information beyond the common prior the …rm does not invest. For any additional private information
of the …rm to change the "default" behavior , it has to be that the …rm is investing after receiving the
good signal, or that
qx + (1

q) ( 1)

0,x

1

q
q

1
:
1+x

,q

(28)

In other words, the information has to be su¢ ciently precise–thus q su¢ ciently large–to induce a change
in the behavior.
Conditional on being type g; the …rm will have an incentive to invest (when told to invest) under
p = (pBb ; pBg ; pGb ; pGg ) if
1
(1
2

1
q) pBg + qpGg x
2

0 , pGg

1
q

q pBg
;
x

(29)

and an incentive to not invest (when told to not invest) if
0

1
(1
2

q) (1

1
pBg ) + q (1
2

pGg ) x , pGg

1

q pBg
+1
q
x

1

q1
:
q x

(30)

A similar pair of incentive constraints apply to the recommendations conditional on being type b.
As long as the private information of the …rm is su¢ ciently noisy, or q

1= (1 + x), the binding

constraint is (29) as in the uninformed case; otherwise it is the inequality (30) that determines the
conditional probabilities. The obedience conditions for the …rm observing a bad type b are derived in an
analogous manner. The obedience conditions are de…ned type by type and we compute the restrictions
on the conditional probabilities averaged across types. Now the decision rule (pBb ; pBg ; pGb ; pGg ) will
induce behavior (pB ; pG ) integrating over types t 2 fb; gg.
The behavior of the equilibrium set is illustrated in Figure 2. Note that the sets becomes smaller
as the …rm’s private information improves. Intuitively, the …rm’s private information limits the government’s ability to in‡uence the …rm’s decision as the private information tightens the obedience
constraints. We observe that the boundary that describes the sets of obedient decision rules maintains
a constant slope independent of q, namely 1=x; and it is only the intercept that moves upward. Moreover, the slope is identical with the one described in the problem of the uninformed …rm. The lowest
probability of investing in the good state is achieved if there is zero probability of investing in the bad
state as derived earlier in (11).
Additional Results for Section 6.2

For a given Bayesian game (G; S), let E(G; S), respectively,

NE(G; S), denote the set of decision rules that can be attained with and without elicitation, respectively.
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Proposition 5
For each (G; S), we have
NE(G; S)
Proof. Let
To show that

2 N E(G; S), and let

Fix player i, types
0
i (bi (ti ))

be an obedient contingent recommendation that induces .

2 E(G; S), we will verify that
ti ; t0i

E(G; S):

is incentive compatible.

2 Ti , and a function

i:

Ai ! Ai . For each strategy bi 2 Bi , take a0i =

in player i’s (ti ; bi ) publicly feasible obedience constraint. Then sum the resulting inequalities

over bi 2 Bi . After regrouping the summation, we have
1
0
X
X
@
ui ((bi (ti ); b i (t i )); ) ((bi ; b i )j )A (ti ; t i j ) ( )
t

t

i 2T i ;

X

i 2T i ;

2

2

0

(bi ;b

@

i )2B

X

(bi ;b

ui ( i (bi (t0i )); b i (t i ));

i )2B

1

((bi ; b i )j )A (ti ; t i j ) ( ):

We focus on the term in parentheses on each line. In the …rst line, group the summation according to
the value of (bi (ti ); b i (t i )) and use the fact that
X

(ai ;a

induces

to obtain

ui ((ai ; a i ); ) ((ai ; a i )j(ti ; t i ); ):

i )2A

In the second line, group the summation according to the value of (bi (t0i ); b i (t i )) and use the fact that
induces

to obtain

X

(ai ;a

ui (( i (ai ); a i ); ) ((ai ; a i )j(t0i ; t i ); ):

i )2A

Substituting these expressions into the inequality gives player i’s type-ti incentive constraint with deviation t0i ; i . Since i; ti ; t0i ;

i

are all arbitrary, the proof is complete.

Proposition 6
Let (G; S) be a Bayesian game with I = 1. If jAj = 2 and j j = 2, then
NE(G; S) = E(G; S):
Proof. By Proposition 5, it su¢ ces to prove N E(G; S)
Label the states and actions so that

E(G; S). First, we simplify the notation.

= fG; Bg and A = f0; 1g. If either action is weakly dominant,

the desired result can be veri…ed by directly computing N E(G; S) and E(G; S). Therefore, we assume
u(1; G)

u(0; G) and u(1; B)

u(0; B) are each nonzero and have opposite signs. Then without loss,

we may assume the payo¤s take the form u(0; G) = u(0; B) = 0, u(1; B) =
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1 and u(1; G) = x >

0.25 Action 1 can be interpreted as investment. We will represent a decision rule
p = (p t )(

;t)2

T,

by a vector

where p t = (1j ; t). For each signal t 2 T , let
(G) (tjG)
;
(t)

q(t) =

where (t) = (G) (tjG) + (B) (tjB) > 0 by assumption.
Let p = (p t ) 2 E(G; S). To show that p 2 N E(G; S), we will explicitly construct an obedient

that induces p. Let t; t0 2 T and set q = q(t) and q 0 = q(t0 ). Since p

contingent recommendation

satis…es the truthtelling constraint,
qpGt x
q 0 pGt0 x
Taking (1

q0; 1

(1
(1

q)pBt

qpGt0 x

(1

q)pBt0 ;

q 0 )pBt0

q 0 pGt x

(1

q 0 )pBt :

q) and (q 0 ; q) linear combinations of these two inequalities respectively yields
q 0 )(pGt

(q
So q(t) < q(t0 ) implies p

t

p

t0

pGt0 )x

for

0 and (q

q 0 )(pBt

pBt0 )

0:

2 fG; Bg. In the case q = q 0 , both inequalities must hold with

equality so
q(pGt
and hence pGt

pGt0 i¤ pBt
q(t1 )

pGt0 ) = (1

q)(pBt

pBt0 );

pBt0 . Therefore, we can label the signals t1 ; : : : ; tn so that
q(tn )

and

p

p

t1

tn

To simplify notation, de…ne ql = q(tl ) for each l = 1; : : : ; n; set p

for
t0

= B; G:

= 0 and p

tn+1

(31)
= 1 for all . For

each k = 1; : : : ; n + 1, de…ne the cuto¤ strategy bk by
8
>
<1 if l k;
k
b (tl ) =
>
:0 otherwise.

In particular b1 is unconditional investment, and bn+1 is unconditional non-investment. De…ne the

stochastic contingent recommendation :
8
>
<p t
p tk
k
(bj ) =
>
:0
25

!
1

(B) by

if b = bk for some k = 1; : : : ; n + 1;
otherwise.

First, swap the labels G and B if needed to obtain u(1; G)

u(1; G)

u(0; G) > 0. Then rescale the utility function so that

u(0; G) = 1. Finally, translate the functions u( ; G) and u( ; B) separately so that u(0; G) = u(0; B) = 0. The

separate translations may change the agent’s preferences over states but not over actions.
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By (31), p
that

p

tk

tk

0, so ( j ) is a probability distribution for each

1

2 fG; Bg. It is easy to check

induces the decision rule p.

To complete the proof, we verify that

is obedient. For each l = 1; : : : ; n and k = 1; : : : ; n + 1, type

tl ’s expected utility from investing if and only if being recommended bk is:
pGtk 1 )x

Uljk = ql (pGtk

(1

pBtk 1 ):

ql )(pBtk

Since both expressions in parentheses are nonnegative, Uljk is weakly increasing in l. Therefore, for
types tl with l

k,
Ukjk = (qk pGtk x

Uljk

(1

qk pGtk 1 x

qk )pBtk )

(1

qk )pBtk

1

0;

where the last inequality holds by truth-telling for k > 1 and obedience for k = 1. Similarly, for types
tl with l < k,
Uljk

Uk

1jk

= (qk

1 pGtk x

(1

qk

1 )pBtk )

qk

1 pGtk

1

x

(1

qk

1 )pBtk

1

0:

The last two inequalities establish the obedience of , so the proof is complete.
Now we return to the main problem of …nding (pBb ; pBg ; pGb ; pGg ). To compare these decision rules
to the benchmark we will ultimately integrate over the signals to compute the probability of investment
in each state. Formally,
(pBb ; pBg ; pGb ; pGg ) ! ((1

q)pBg + qpBb ; qpGg + (1

q)pGb ) :

With an informed receiver, the omniscient designer faces four obedience constraints:

More precisely,

1
t

1
g

, qpGg x

1
b

, (1

q)pGb x

0
g

, q(1

pGg )y

0
b

, (1

(1

q)(1

q)pBg

qpGg y

qpBb
1

q
2

pGb )y

(1
(1
q
(1
2

1

q
2

q)pGb y

pBg )
pBb )

0;
0:

pBg

0;

(32a)

q
pBb
2

0:

(32b)
(32c)
(32d)

denotes the di¤erence in type t’s utility between investing large and small when

told to invest large and

0
t

denotes the di¤erence in type t’s utility between investing small and not

investing when told not to invest. We thus have only ruled out pro…table truthful deviations to the
small investment, but it can be shown that this implies that there are no pro…table truthful deviations
to not invest or to invest large. An information designer with elicitation faces four additional constraints
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ruling out non-truthful deviations:
qpGg x

(1

q)pBg

qpGb x

(1

qpGg x

(1

q)pBg

q(pGb x + (1

pGb )y)
qpBg ;
q
pBg :
2

(1

q)pGb x

qpBb

(1

q)pGg x

(1

q)pGb x

qpBb

(1

q)pGg y

q)pBb ;

(33a)
(1

q)

1 + pBb
;
2

(33b)
(33c)
(33d)

Again, it is su¢ cient to consider a smaller class of deviations because the high type …nds investment
more attractive than the low type does. Formally, E(G; S) is the set of p 2 [0; 1]4 satisfying (32a)-(33d).
Now we determine the additional constraints faced by an information designer without elicitation. Since there are only two signals, we may represent each strategy b : T ! A as an ordered pair

(b(g); b(b)) 2 A2 . (In the second component, the letter b is used in two di¤erent ways, to denote a
strategy and a signal.) The strategy b = (not invest; invest) can never be obedient for both types, so
for any p 2 N E(G; S), there is only one candidate , namely
((0; 0)j ) = 1

p g;

((0; 1)j ) = 0;
((1; 0)j ) = p

p b;

g

((1; 1)j ) = p b ;
for each

2 fB; Gg. A designer without elicitation faces two additional obedience constraints, which

prevent deviations following the recommendation (invest;not invest):
q(pGg
(1

pGb )x

q)(pGg

(1

q)(pBg

pBb )

q(pGg

pGb )y

q
(pBg
2

pBb )

0:

1

pGb )y

q
2

(pBg

pBb );

(34a)
(34b)

Formally, N E(G; S) is the set of decision rules in E(G; S) satisfying (34a) and (34b).
After some algebra, we can see that (34a) is equivalent to
1
g

1
b

+ pGb (2q

1)(x

y) + pBb (2q

1)=2:

(35)

When p puts positive probability on investing after a bad signal, (35) eliminates decision rules for which
(32a) has little slack. Similarly, (34b) is equivalent to
0
b

0
g

(1

pGg )(2q

1)y

(1

pBg )(2q

1)=2:

(36)

When p puts positive probability on not investing after a good signal, (36) eliminates decision rules for
which (32d) does not have too much slack.
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Example 1 (Two Agents) Suppose I = 2,

= fB; Gg, A1 = A2 ={invest, not invest}, and

ui (ai ; a i ; ) = u(ai ; ) with u as in the opening example given by (5). Each player i receives a conditionally independent signal ti 2 fg; bg that is correct with probability qi > 1=2. Suppose q1 > q2 , so that
player 1 receives a more accurate signal. Consider the following decision rule: both players invest if
player 1’s signal is good and neither agent invests if player 1’s signal is bad. For x su¢ ciently near one,
this decision rule is incentive compatible. However, it is not even publicly feasible because following any
contingent recommendation, player 2’s choice of action will depend on her own signal, not on player
1’s.
Example 2 (Three States) Consider the single player, single investment setting of the opening example given by (5), but now split the bad state into two bad states B1 and B2 , each with prior probability
1=4 and the same payo¤ s as in state B of the original example. Suppose the agents receive a completely
uninformative binary signal t taking values t1 and t2 with equal probability. Consider the following
decision rule: type ti invests precisely in states G and Bi . For x 2 (1=2; 1), this decision rule is incentive compatible. It is uniquely induced by recommending (b(t1 ); b(t2 )) = (invest; invest) in state G;
(b(t1 ); b(t2 )) = (invest;not invest) in state B1 ; and (b(t1 ); b(t2 )) = (not invest;invest) in state B2 . However, this contingent recommendation perfectly reveals the state of the world, so the agent can pro…tably
deviate to his …rst-best strategy of investing i¤ the state is G. Therefore, the decision rule is not publicly
feasible obedient.
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